A risky launch at risk

Launching at risk is not a business for those who have a weak stomach.

Once a generic drug company has decided that it will go on the market despite the existence of an IP threat – e.g. because they have determined that the IP right at stake is probably invalid or unenforceable – then anything can happen, and it may happen really fast.

Today’s decision illustrates the risks of a launch at risk.

GD Searle LLC owns European patent No. EP 0810209 filed on August 24, 1993. The patent is directed to a family of antiretroviral drugs, more precisely protease inhibitors, useful for the treatment of HIV infection.

On May 9, 2008, Searle obtained a Supplementary Protection Certificate (SPC) from the French patent office (INPI), under No. FR 07C0034. This SPC is based on the EP’209 patent and relates to “darunavir or one of its pharmaceutically acceptable salts, esters or precursors“.

An exclusive license to the SPC was granted to Janssen Sciences Ireland Unlimited Company and then a sub-license was granted to its French affiliate Janssen-Cilag SAS. Janssen (Johnson & Johnson group) markets a drug known as Prezista®, the active compound of which is darunavir.

SAS Sandoz is a French affiliate of the Sandoz group (affiliated to Novartis). As readers have probably already guessed by now, Sandoz launched a generic version of Prezista® before the expiry of the French SPC – which is set to take place on February 23, 2019.

Another form of launch at risk.

The parties have been entangled in pan-European litigation over the darunavir SPCs. This litigation actually hit the headlines when, on January 25, 2018, the British Court of Appeal referred a question to the CJEU in relation with the validity of the British SPC.

The case is still pending and was allocated number C-114/18.

The issue at stake is the following.

Claim 1 of the EP’209 patent is a so-called Markush claim.

A Markush claim covers a large class of chemical compounds by way of a generic formula, without reciting them individually. In this case, the generic formula contained in claim 1 is the following:

Each group among P1, P2, R2, R3 and R4 is defined as being selected among of list of possible options. I will spare you the complete lists here. But it may be important to note that each list itself recites generic classes of groups, rather than individualized groups. For instance P1 and P2 can be alkoxycarbonyl groups, aralkoxycarbonyl groups, alkylcarbonyl groups, etc. Each of these options encompasses an unknown number of individual possibilities. In the end, the array of choices falling under the generic formula is practically unlimited.

Well, not quite. In fact the number of theoretical possibilities was estimated in the British litigation to be from 7 x 10135 to 1 x 10377. Not a very accurate estimate, but let’s not skimp on a couple hundred zeros.

Now, darunavir has the following structure:

It turns out to be one of the zillion compounds covered by claim 1

Several other claims of the patent also cover darunavir, but always in a generic way. Darunavir is not cited in the patent, not exemplified, nor singled out in any other manner.

Now, according to famous / infamous article 3(a) of the so-called SPC Regulation (Regulation (EC) No. 469/2009):

A certificate shall be granted if, in the Member State in which the application referred to in Article 7 is submitted and at the date of that application:

(a) the product is protected by a basic patent in force […].

As regular readers of this blog are well aware, people have been arguing, fighting and spending millions and millions of euros for a number of years over what it means for a product to be protected by a basic patent.

Some (limited) guidance has been offered by the CJEU over time.

For instance, this is from the Medeva judgment (C-322/10):

Article 3(a) of [the SPC Regulation] must be interpreted as precluding the [grant on an] SPC relating to active ingredients which are not specified in the wording of the claims of the basic patent relied on in support of the SPC application.

Then there is the Eli Lilly judgment (C-493/12):

Article 3(a) of [the SPC Regulation] must be interpreted as meaning that, in order for an active ingredient to be regarded as ‘protected by a basic patent in force’ within the meaning of that provision, it is not necessary for the active ingredient to be identified in the claims of the patent by a structural formula. Where the active ingredient is covered by a functional formula in the claims of a patent issued by the EPO, Article 3(a) of that regulation does not, in principle, preclude the grant of an SPC for that active ingredient, on condition that it is possible to reach the conclusion on the basis of those claims, interpreted inter alia in the light of the description of the invention, as required by Article 69 of the EPC and the Protocol on the interpretation of that provision, that the claims relate, implicitly but necessarily and specifically, to the active ingredient in question […].

And let’s not forget about Teva (C-121/17):

Article 3(a) of [the SPC Regulation] must be interpreted as meaning that a product composed of several active ingredients with a combined effect is ‘protected by a basic patent in force’ within the meaning of that provision where, even if the combination of active ingredients of which that product is composed is not expressly mentioned in the claims of the basic patent, those claims relate necessarily and specifically to that combination. For that purpose, from the point of view of a person skilled in the art and on the basis of the prior art at the filing date or priority date of the basic patent: the combination of those active ingredients must necessarily, in the light of the description and drawings of that patent, fall under the invention covered by that patent, and each of those active ingredients must be specifically identifiable, in the light of all the information disclosed by that patent.

And there are a few other relevant ones.

But the thing is, the CJEU has never ruled so far on how article 3(a) should be applied with respect to a Markush claim. So, in this case, should darunavir be considered as being “specified in the wording of the claims” (as per Medeva)? Is it possible to conclude that the claim “relates, implicitly but necessarily and specifically“, to darunavir (as per Eli Lilly)? Or is this not a relevant question as the claim should not be considered as a functional claim? Or maybe a combination of substituents in a Markush formula should be treated like a combination of active compounds, so that it should be investigated whether, “from the point of view of a person skilled in the art and on the basis of the prior art at the filing date or priority date of the basic patent“, each of the substituents is “specifically identifiable, in the light of all the information disclosed by that patent” (as per Teva)?

Of particular interest in this case is that, not only was darunavir not known as a compound at the filing date and was only made available several years later; but group P1 of the generic formula, when the formula applies to darunavir, can be considered as an unusual group at the filing date, which does not form part of common general knowledge.

The British Court of appeal thus proposed the following question for the CJEU:

Where the sole active ingredient the subject of [an SPC] issued under [the SPC Regulation] is a member of a class of compounds which fall within a Markush definition in a claim of the patent, all of which class members embody the core inventive technical advance of the patent, is it sufficient for the purposes of Article 3(a) of the SPC Regulation that the compound would, upon examination of its structure, immediately be recognised as one which falls within the class (and therefore would be protected by the patent as a matter of national patent law) or must the specific substituents necessary to form the active ingredient be amongst those which the skilled person could derive, based on their common general knowledge, from a reading of the patent claims?

And this now brings us to France.

Sandoz obtained a Marketing authorization (MA) for the generic version of Prezista® on December 15, 2017. Searle and Janssen issued multiple warnings to Sandoz and then discovered in December 2018 that the generic drug (Darunavir Sandoz) was on the French market.

On December 14, 2018, they filed a complaint against Sandoz in urgency proceedings (référé d’heure à heure) for infringement of their SPC No. FR’034 – after getting an authorization to do so from the court.

Sandoz’ sole defense relied on the invalidity of the SPC for non-compliance with art. 3(a) the SPC Regulation. 

The hearing took place one week only after the filing of the complaint, on December 21, 2018. Then the judge Ms. Lignières took the case home during the Christmas break and issued her decision on January 11, 2019, ruling against Sandoz.

In the decision, the judge analyzed the CJEU case law and came to the conclusion that the Eli Lilly test is not applicable to a Markush claim:

It should be noted that, in the Eli Lilly decision, the case related to a functional claim, so that the CJEU insisted on a double condition of necessity and specificity. In the present case, the claims of the basic patent are structural and better allow the skilled person to determined in view of the claims whether the active compound protected by the SPC was covered by the basic patent. 

Then, after analyzing the formula of claim 1 of the patent and the various meanings of the variable groups in this claim and some of the dependent claims, the court concluded that:

Therefore darunavir is identified by the skilled person as being implicitly but necessarily and specifically protected by the EP’209 patent in view of the substituents identified in the claims, in keeping with the requirements of article 3(a) of the EC Regulation and of the CJEU case law.

The judge thus considered that the defendant did not prove that the SPC was manifestly invalid.

Accordingly, a preliminary injunction was ordered, under a 50,000 euro-penalty per violation of the injunction. The judge also ordered a seizure of the infringing drugs, as well as a product recall.

I don’t have an exhaustive view of the pan-European Searle v. Sandoz litigation, but at least in the Netherlands a similar preliminary ruling was issued a couple of months earlier: see here.

In a recent post I wondered whether there was a surge in preliminary injunctions in France these days. The darunavir case seems to provide a confirmation. 

We will have to wait for the CJEU ruling to know whether the French judge correctly guessed which way the Luxembourg winds will finally blow.

But at any rate this decision should reassure IP right holders. A very quick preliminary decision can be issued in France when time is of the essence. Therefore, launching a generic drug a couple of months before the expiry of the IP at stake does not curtail the injunctive risk.


CASE REFERENCE: TGI Paris, ordonnance de référé, January 11, 2019, GD Searle LLC et al. v. SAS Sandoz, RG No. 18/60334

Doppelgänger

The names of the parties in the case commented upon today first reminded me of the classic movie Kramer vs. Kramer. But you could also think about the Doppelgänger.

See, the case at hand is Novartis v. Novartis or, to be more precise, SAS Novartis Pharma v. Novartis Pharma AG.

The judgment is very short and utterly uninteresting in itself, but as you will see the underlying context is much more noteworthy.

Let’s start with the judgment per se first.

Novartis Pharma AG is the owner of European patent No. EP 1096932 entitled “Combined use of valsartan and calcium channel blockers for therapeutic purposes“.

Novartis Pharma AG is also the owner of French SPC No. 07C0042, which was granted in 2008. This SPC is based on the EP’932 patent and on a European Marketing authorization (MA) and is directed to a medicinal product comprising the two active substances valsartan and amlodipine.

The corresponding commercial drug marketed by the Novartis group is Exforge®.

The EP’932 patent was opposed by 8 different opponents at the EPO. In first instance, the patent was maintained in amended form by the opposition division.

On appeal, after the issuance of the summons to oral proceedings, Novartis Pharma AG withdrew all its requests and disapproved of the text of the patent, which led to the revocation of the patent on October 7, 2015.

On January 29, 2018, another company from the Novartis group, namely SAS Novartis Pharma, filed a complaint with the Paris Tribunal de grande instance (TGI) and requested that the TGI should revoke SPC No. 07C0042, as a consequence of the revocation of the basic patent.

The “defendant” Novartis Pharma AG agreed, and the court thus pronounced the requested revocation of the SPC on April 5, 2018.

Let me introduce the bunny and his feline Doppelgänger.

Now, in case you are wondering, of course the various Novartis companies have not run amok.

No, this unusual ruling seems to be the result of a very elaborate strategy, which can be (at least partly) comprehended based on publicly available information.

The first thing you need to know is that two divisional applications were filed based on the EP’932 patent.

The first one was deemed to be withdrawn, but the second one led to the grant of another patent, EP 2322174. On the face of it, the EP’174 patent contains claims which are somewhat similar to those of EP’932, and which still cover the combination of valsartan and amlodipine.

The second important thing is that another French SPC application (No. 16C0008) was filed based on the divisional patent EP’174, still for the combination of valsartan and amlodipine, on March 7, 2016 (thus a few months after the grant of EP’174 on September 15, 2015 and after the revocation of the parent EP’932 patent on October 7, 2015).

Based on publicly available information, the second SPC was initially granted in June 2016. But then, three months later, on September 26, 2016, the decision to grant the SPC was withdrawn by the INPI (French patent office). Indeed, the withdrawal or cancellation of any decision issued by the INPI is possible as a matter of principle within a four-month time limit.

Examination of SPC application No. 16C0008 was immediately resumed, and an office action was issued, in which an objection was raised based on the existence of the prior SPC No. 07C0042. As a reminder, article 3(c) of the SPC regulation (aka Regulation (EC) No. 469/2009 of the European Parliamant and of the Council of May 6, 2009) provides that a certificate can only be granted if “the product has not already been the subject of a certificate“.

As a first line of defense, Novartis replied that the revocation of the EP’932 patent also automatically entails the annihilation of the first SPC No. 07C0042, in a retroactive manner. Therefore, they argued, the valsartan + amlodipine product in the second SPC application No. 16C0008 had not already been the subject of a certificate.

But the INPI was not convinced and maintained its objection.

With that in mind, the strange Novartis v. Novartis action suddenly becomes much more understandable.

Novartis’ purpose was to obtain an official ruling from a court of law per which the first SPC was revoked. This strengthened their argument with the INPI. And the strategy was successful, as the objection based on article 3(c) of the SPC regulation was overcome and the second SPC was finally granted (for the second time) in June 2018.

Based on the arguments submitted by Novartis which can be read in the SPC file wrapper, second SPCs replacing the first round of SPCs were also obtained in a similar manner in a number of other European countries.

At this stage, one question remained for me: why did Novartis find it useful to surrender its parent patent and all SPCs obtained based on it, and to start the entire procedure from scratch based on the divisional patent and a second set of SPC applications?

Well, sometimes a blogger has to play detective. Comparing the two different SPC applications, it appears that both are based on the same MA having effect in France, namely European MA No. EU/1/6/371/001-24. But then one difference immediately becomes obvious in the next box of the application form.

In the first SPC application, the first MA obtained in the Community or EEE is indicated as being this same MA No. EU/1/6/371/001-24, dated January 16, 2007. But in the second SPC application, the first MA obtained in the Community or EEE is indicated as being a slightly earlier Swiss MA No. 57771/01-03, dated December 22, 2006. Actually, since the AstraZeneca judgment of the CJEU (C-617/12), we have known that Swiss MAs count as potential first MAs in the Community or EEE, as they are automatically recognized in Liechtenstein.

So the Doppelgänger mystery is solved – I think: the initial SPC application contained a mistake, in that the indication of the first MA obtained in the Community or EEE was not correct. Hence the need to get rid of the first patent and first SPC, in order to obtain a corrected SPC based on the second patent.  

I would be curious to know whether Novartis’ clever strategy succeeded in all European countries or whether it failed in some of them.

More generally, I would be curious to know what readers make of all this.

Should the revocation of a first SPC indeed make it possible to request a second SPC as if the first SPC had never been granted?

This does raise policy issues. Imagine that the first SPC had been revoked further to a nullity suit filed by a true third party. Would it be fair to allow the SPC owner to obtain a second SPC essentially identical to the first one, based on a divisional patent?

At any rate, this case will probably be a further incentive to file divisional applications for important inventions which could potentially be protected by an SPC. More than ever, divisional applications appear to be a very powerful (some would say, too powerful) tool in the hands of IP right holders.


CASE REFERENCE: TGI de Paris, 3ème chambre, 1ère section, April 5, 2018, SAS Novartis Pharma v. Novartis Pharma AG, RG No. 18/02118.

All eyes are on the Court of justice

A tout seigneur tout honneur, today’s decision, being about SPCs, was first reported on the SPC blog.

However, I would like to talk about it as well because, unlike British courts, it is not every day that the Paris Cour d’appel refers questions to the CJEU.

The case relates to a European patent owned by Santen, a pharmaceutical company specialized in ophthalmology.

Claim 1 of the patent is directed to a particular type of oil-in-water emulsion. According to a dependent claim, the emulsion may contain an active ingredient. According to another dependent claim, the active ingredient is cyclosporine A. Finally, another claim relates to the use of the emulsion for the preparation of an ophthalmic composition for the treatment of ocular diseases such as notably keratitis.

Santen obtained a Marketing authorization (MA) for the drug Ikervis®, which is an emulsion containing cyclosporine as an active ingredient and is indicated for the treatment of severe keratitis.

On June 3, 2015, Santen filed an SPC application at the French patent office (INPI) for “cyclosporine emulsion eye drops”. The SPC application was later amended to rename the product as “cyclosporine for its use in the treatment of keratitis”.

On October 6, 2017, the SPC application was finally refused by the INPI. The reason for the refusal was the existence of a prior MA dating back to 1983, for the drug Sandimmum®.

This drug is in the form of a drinkable solution, in which the active ingredient is also cyclosporine. The therapeutic indications range from the prevention of transplant rejection, to the treatment of endogenous uveitis (which is another ocular disease).

In the SPC business, you gotta always keep an eye out for the next CJEU case law.

Santen appealed the refusal in front of the Paris Cour d’appel. Instead of deciding on the merits of the case, the court referred some questions to the CJEU regarding the interpretation of article 3 (d) of regulation (EC) No 469/2009, nicknamed the “SPC regulation”.

Article 3 (d) lays down one of the conditions for obtaining an SPC, namely that the MA referred to in the SPC application should be the first authorization “to place the product on the market as a medicinal product”.

The most important ruling from the CJEU regarding the interpretation of this article is Neurim (C-130/11) of July 11, 2012.

According to this ruling, the existence of an earlier MA obtained for a veterinary medicinal product does not preclude the grant of an SPC for a different application of the same product for which the MA has been granted, provided that the application is within the limits of the protection conferred by the basic patent relied upon for the purposes of the application for the SPC.

In Neurim, an SPC application for a formulation of melatonin useful for the treatment of insomnia had been initially refused due to the existence of an earlier MA for melatonin in a veterinary product (more precisely for the regulation of seasonal breeding activity in sheep). The Court of justice clarified that, in such a situation, the SPC application should not have been refused for this reason.

However, with the Luxembourg Court, most clarifications usually raise additional questions.

Case in point, Neurim was widely interpreted as a reversal of earlier case law (in particular Pharmacia Italia C-31/03 and Yissum C-205/05) but the Court of justice did not say a word about this in the judgment. More importantly, people wondered how far the principle set out in Neurim should extend. That is, how should the expression of the Court “a different application of the same product for which [an MA] has been granted” be interpreted?

Does the expression refer to veterinary vs. human use only, like in the facts underlying the Neurim judgment? Or does it extend to the treatment of different human diseases? Or to different formulations or modes of administration?

In the Santen case, the INPI noted that there are various interpretations of Neurim across Europe. The French administration’s current position is that Neurim should be applied in a “measured” manner.

The INPI believes in particular that there are two reasons why Neurim does not apply to Santen’s SPC application:

  • First, the scope of the basic patent should correspond to that of the MA which is relied upon, like in the Neurim case (cf. the proviso that “the application is within the limits of the protection conferred by the basic patent” in the order of Neurim). This is not the case here, said the INPI, because the basic patent mainly relates to a particular emulsion. Keratitis is only one of the diseases that can be treated according to the patent. Uveitis (i.e. one of the diseases treated by the former drug Sandimmum®) is also mentioned in the dependent Swiss-type claim of the patent.
  • Second, the MA which is relied upon should relate to “a new therapeutic field”, i.e. a new medical specialty, or a drug, the active ingredient of which should have a different mode of action from that exerted in the drug of the previous MA. Again, this is not the case here, the INPI argued, since both MAs relate to the treatment of inflammations of the human eye, by the same mode of action of the same substance (cyclosporine). Thus, a new medical use is not sufficiently demonstrated. The INPI’s position seems to be that a “new medical use” in this context has to be appraised in a stricter manner than in the context of a patentability appraisal.

Santen challenged this position, and stated that the conditions demanded by the INPI cannot be derived from the Neurim judgment. Santen insisted on the fact that Sandimmum® and Ikervis® have different therapeutic indications, and treat different diseases in different parts of the eye. Their respective formulations, dosages and modes of administration also differ.

The court considered both positions and came to the conclusion that “when reading the Neurim judgment it is not possible to interpret this notion of different application, which is essential for deciding the case, with any certainty”.

Thus, the Cour d’appel stayed the proceedings and referred the two following questions to the Court of justice:

1. Should the notion of different application under the CJEU Neurim judgment C-130/11 of July 19, 2012:

– be understood in a strict manner, namely be limited to the sole case of a human application following a veterinary application;

– or relate to an indication pertaining to a new therapeutic field, namely a new medical specialty, relative to the previous MA, or to a drug in which the active ingredient has a different action from the one it has in the drug of the first MA;

– or more generally, in view of the purposes of Regulation (EC) No. 469/2009 aiming at setting up a balanced system taking into account all the interests at stake, including those of public health, be appraised according to more demanding criteria than those applied for appraising patentability of the invention;

– or on the contrary be understood in an extensive manner, i.e. as including not only different therapeutic indications and diseases, but also different formulations, dosages and/or modes of administration.

2. Does the notion of application within the limits of the protection conferred by the basic patent under the CJEU Neurim judgment C-130/11 of July 19, 2012 imply that the scope of the basic patent should correspond to that of the MA relied upon, and consequently be limited to the new medical use corresponding to the therapeutic indication of said MA?

In other words, some very precise and extensive questioning of the scope of article 3 (d) of the SPC Regulation. That said, the likelihood that the Court of justice will clearly answer by yes or no as to whether Neurim applies to different diseases, different formulations, etc. is probably close to zero. It is much more likely that the Luxembourg judges will offer a new general test which will still leave room for interpretation. This is indeed the game that has been played quite extensively in the past few years.

The other thing is that there is also another referral pending on the interpretation of Neurim, namely the Abraxis case (C-443/17).

Unsurprisingly, this is a referral by the High Court in the UK. The question asked is the following:

Is Article 3(d) of the SPC Regulation to be interpreted as permitting the grant of an SPC where the MA referred to in Article 3(b) is the first authorization within the scope of the basic patent to place the product on the market as a medicinal product and where the product is a new formulation of an old active ingredient?

In Abraxis, an SPC application was filed based on an MA for paclitaxel bound to albumin nanoparticles, but the issue was the existence of an earlier MA for solvent-based paclitaxel.

The Advocate General’s opinion in Abraxis is expected to be released on October 25, 2018. Will the Santen referral remain useful or relevant once Abraxis is decided?

As always with the SPC saga, to be continued.


CASE REFERENCE: Cour d’appel de Paris, pôle 5 chambre 1, October 9, 2018, SAS Santen v. Directeur Général de l’INPI, RG No. 17/19934.

The single question

When you come to think about it, most of the issues that are discussed on a daily basis in patent cases seem to always boil down to one single question: same or different?

Take novelty: is the claimed subject-matter the same as that of the prior art or is it different? Or take infringement: does the allegedly infringing product or process differ from the claims of the patent? The list continues with extension of subject-matter, priority, etc.

Nevertheless, we patent attorneys or lawyers do not get bored, because this multifaceted single question is in fact extremely complex and gets renewed all the time. The most perfect example is probably supplementary protection certificates (SPCs), an area of law in flux if there ever was one.

Spot the differences – a patent attorney’s favorite game.

Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. (MSD) is the owner of European patent No. EP 0720599. The patent is directed to the treatment and prevention of atherosclerosis and more particularly to a class of compounds called hydroxy substituted azetidinones, among which the molecule known as ezetimibe.

Ezetimibe is in fact explicitly recited in claim 8 of the patent.

Of note are also claims 9, 16 and 17, which are worded as follows:

9. A pharmaceutical composition for the treatment or prevention of atherosclerosis, or for the reduction of plasma cholesterol levels, comprising an effective amount of a compound as claimed in any one of claims 1 to 8, alone or in combination with a cholesterol biosynthesis inhibitor, in a pharmaceutically acceptable carrier.

16. A pharmaceutical composition of any of claims 9, 12 or 15 wherein the cholesterol biosynthesis inhibitor is selected from the group consisting of HMG CoA reductase inhibitors, squalene synthesis inhibitors and squalene epoxidase inhibitors.

17. A pharmaceutical composition of claim 16 wherein the cholesterol biosynthesis inhibitor is selected from the group consisting of lovastatin, pravastatin, fluvastatin, simvastatin, Cl-981, DMP-565, L-659,699, squalestatin 1 and NB-55 598.

Two SPCs were successively granted by the French patent office (INPI) based on this European patent, namely:

  • First, SPC No. 03C0028, for a medicament comprising ezetimibe as an active, based on a marketing authorization (MA) for the drug Ezetrol®.
  • Second, SPC No. 05C0040, for a medicament comprising a combination of the active compounds ezetimibe and simvastatine, based on an MA for the drug Inegy®.

The European patent expired in 2014. The first (mono) SPC expired on April 17, 2018. The term of the second (combo) SPC is April 2, 2019.

In August 2017, the generic drug company Biogaran obtained an MA for a combination of ezetimibe and simvastatine and began preparing for the launch of this generic version of Inegy®.

In December 2017, Biogaran filed a nullity action against the combo SPC in front of the Paris Tribunal de grande instance (TGI). In February 2018, the U.S. MSD company and its French subsidiary initiated urgency proceedings and requested an injunction against Biogaran in view of an imminent infringement threat.

On April 5, 2018, an order was issued per which MSD’s request for injunction was denied. An appeal was filed, and the Paris Cour d’appel dismissed MSD’s appeal on June 26, 2018.

French legal proceedings are, as a general rule, not extremely quick. But sometimes they can be, as the present case shows. In fact, I did not even have time to become aware of and report on the first instance order, before the appeal ruling came out. Well, the fact that this blog has been somewhat slow in the past few months does not help, I will grant you that.

The reason why the President of the Paris TGI denied MSD’s request in the order of April 2018 is that the combo SPC was considered as invalid. This was confirmed on appeal.

Before delving into the details of the ruling, we need to go back, as always, to article 3 of the SPC regulation (officially known as Regulation (EC) No. 469/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council):

A certificate shall be granted if, in the Member State in which the application referred to in Article 7 is submitted and at the date of that application:
(a) the product is protected by a basic patent in force;
(b) a valid authorisation to place the product on the market as a medicinal product has been granted in accordance with Directive 2001/83/EC or Directive 2001/82/EC, as appropriate;
(c) the product has not already been the subject of a certificate;
(d) the authorisation referred to in point (b) is the first authorisation to place the product on the market as a medicinal product. 

Biogaran contended that the combo SPC was invalid for non-compliance with articles 3(a), 3(c) and 3(d). Their position was that:

  • regarding article 3(a), simvastatine is not claimed “as such” in the EP’599 patent, but merely as a substance known from the prior art, which can be used together with ezetimibe, which is claimed “as such“;
  • regarding article 3(c), an SPC had already been granted for the product at stake (namely the mono SPC), because the combination of the drug Ezetrol® with a statine such as simvastatine was already contemplated notably in the summary of product characteristics (SmPC) for this drug; and
  • regarding article 3(d), the MA for Inegy® was not the first MA for the product at stake, for the same reasons.

Interestingly, two further SPC applications similar to the granted combo SPC, namely for the combination of ezetimibe with atorvastatine, and of ezetimibe with rosuvastatine, were rejected by the INPI in February 2018.

In their ruling, the appeal judges made extensive reference to the Actavis judgment of the CJEU, C-443/12.

According to this ruling:

[…] where, on the basis of a patent protecting an innovative active ingredient and a marketing authorisation for a medicinal product containing that ingredient as the single active ingredient, the holder of that patent has already obtained a supplementary protection certificate for that active ingredient entitling him to oppose the use of that active ingredient, either alone or in combination with other active ingredients, Article 3(c) of Regulation (EC) No 469/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 concerning the supplementary protection certificate for medicinal products must be interpreted as precluding that patent holder from obtaining – on the basis of that same patent but a subsequent marketing authorisation for a different medicinal product containing that active ingredient in conjunction with another active ingredient which is not protected as such by the patent – a second supplementary protection certificate relating to that combination of active ingredients.

The facts in Actavis were somewhat different from those of the present case. In Actavis, the patent at stake protected irbesartan and a first MA had been obtained for the mono drug. Then, a second MA was obtained for a combo drug comprising irbesartan and a diuretic, hydrochlorothyiazide (HCTZ). But HCTZ was not specifically named in the patent, whereas in the present case simvastatine is expressly designated in claim 17 of the patent.

That said, this different circumstance does not appear to be essential in view of the broad exclusionary language used in the order of Actavis. The Cour d’appel therefore directly applied Actavis as follows:

[…] MSD, based on the one hand on the EP’599 patent protecting the new active ezetimibe, and on the other hand of the MA […] for Ezetrol® containing ezitimibe as a single active compound, obtained […] SPC ‘028, making it possible to object to the use of said active, either alone or in combination with other actives.
MSD, based on the same patent but on a later MA […] for a different drug Inegy® containing the active ezetimibe in combination with another active, simvastatine, which is not, as such, protected by said patent, requested a second SPC on this combination of actives.
It should be added that the reasons of judgment C-443/12 specify that it is not allowable for the proprietor of a basic patent in force to obtain a new SPC […] every time it markets […] a drug containing, on the one hand, the active protected as such in its basic patent and constituting  […] the core inventive advance of this patent, and on the other hand, another active, which is not protected as such by said patent. 
It is not challenged in this case that simvastatine, which is an active of the category of statines or “HMG CoA reductase inhibitors” is not protected as such by this patent, nor in fact by another patent. 

As a result, the combo SPC was held invalid under article 3(c).

MSD’s defense was that there were two inventions in the basic patent. The first invention was a new class of compounds including ezetimibe. The second invention was the use of ezetimibe with statines.

The court replied that only ezetimibe is a novel active compound. The court also noted that, based on the description of the patent, the combination of compounds did not involve an inventive step (or should this be “inventive advance”? the French expression “activité inventive” can be used for both terms). Although MSD filed an expert declaration to support such inventive step, the court held that such declaration could not cure the lack of inventive step based on the patent itself.

The court also agreed with Biogaran’s auxiliary argument per which, assuming that the mono and combo drugs were considered as different products, the SPC would still be invalid, under article 3(d) this time, because the MA for Inegy® would not be the first MA for the product, because the SmPC for this drug mentioned the association with statine compounds, and in particular simvastatine.

On a procedural standpoint, the outcome of the judgment is thus that the rejection of MSD’s request for injunction is confirmed. The nullity action on the merits is still pending, although of course we now have a good indication of how this is likely to turn out.

Going back to the central question asked at the beginning of this post, “same or different?“, is a drug containing ezetimibe together with a statine compound “the same” as a drug containing ezetimibe as the single active, for the purpose of SPC law? 

The answer appears to be much more complex than the question.

As a Post Script to this report, Biogaran’s invalidity argument based on article 3(a) was not really discussed in the appeal judgment. However, it is notable that a new CJEU ruling has been issued in this connection, namely C-121/17. Since it has already been reported on many blogs (see e.g. here), I will not go over it in detail, but I just wanted to mention it, as Lionel Vial had previously reported on the opinion of the Advocate General in this case on this blog.


CASE REFERENCE: Cour d’appel de Paris, pôle 5 chambre 1, June 26, 2018, Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. & MSD France v. Biogaran, RG No. 18/52397.

The patentee’s tale

For some time, I wondered why the name “Gilead” in the trendy, horrifying, Margaret Atwood inspired TV show The Handmaid’s Tale sounded familiar to me. And then I realized that, yes of course, this is also the name of a famous pharmaceutical company, well known in the patent profession for being currently involved in a number of prominent litigation and opposition cases.

To some extent, patent disputes are like TV shows: they develop in episodes; sometimes unexpectedly, and sometimes not so much.

Lionel Vial reports on a recent decision (which was supplied courtesy of Matthieu Dhenne):

Following-up on our previous report on the refusal of Gilead’s request for preliminary injunction against Mylan in the Truvada® litigation in France based on SPC No. 05C0032, which was handed down on September 5, 2017, the judgement on the merits has now been rendered by the Paris Tribunal de Grande Instance on May 23, 2018.

A parallel decision was also handed down the same day (with the same outcome) with Biogaran as the generic drug manufacturer requesting the nullity of the SPC; it is commented upon here.

As a brief reminder, Truvada® (Gilead) is an anti-HIV drug comprised of the combination of Tenofovir Disoproxyl Fumarate (TDF) and Emtricitabine (FTC) approved for Pre-exposure Prophylaxy (PreP) of HIV infection, since it has been shown to allow for a reduction of 86% of the risk of being infected by HIV.

Truvada® was covered until 25 July 2017 by European patent EP0915894. The effects of the patent have been extended by supplementary protection certificates (SPCs) which will expire between 21 and 24 February 2020 depending on the countries. The SPCs are based on European Union marketing authorization EU/1/04/305/001 and on claim 27 of the basic patent, which reads as follows:

A pharmaceutical composition comprising a compound according to any one of claims 1-25 [N.B. tenofovir disoproxil is claimed in claim 25] together with a pharmaceutical carrier and optionally other therapeutic ingredients. (Emphasis added).

In summary, the essential question asked to the Tribunal is whether the use of the expression “other therapeutic ingredients” to refer to emtricitabine (FTC) is indeed sufficient to protect the TDF/FTC combination pursuant to Article 3(a) of Regulation (EC) No. 469/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council (i.e. the SPC regulation).

So has the Tribunal confirmed its previous provisional opinion on the invalidity of the SPC or has it changed its mind? Let’s see:

[…] The patent on the basis of which SPC No. 32 under litigation was granted neither mentions, in the wording of its claims, emtricitabine, the active ingredient to which the SPC relates in combination with tenofovir disoproxil, nor does it make it necessarily and specifically identifiable, nor does it mention a functional formula implicitly but necessarily and specifically relating to emtricitabine, so that the product is not protected by the basic patent and that the condition laid down in Article 3 (a) of Regulation (EC) No 469/2009 is not fulfilled.

The future of TV shows envisioned in the 80s.

After the first round, the second round is also for Mylan then. Let’s wait for the third round (appeal), bearing in mind that by then the CJEU should have handed down its own decision on the subject (pending as C-121/17).

In this regard, it should be reminded that the Advocate General in his opinion delivered on April 25, 2018 has considered that the Court should answer the question referred for a preliminary ruling by the High Court of Justice of England and Wales as follows:

Article 3(a) of Regulation (EC) No 469/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 concerning the supplementary protection certificate for medicinal products precludes the grant of a supplementary protection certificate relating to active ingredients which are not specified in the wording of the claims of the basic patent. The fact that a substance or combination of substances falls within the scope of protection of the basic patent is a necessary, but not sufficient, requirement for it to constitute a product protected by a patent within the meaning of Article 3(a) of Regulation No 469/2009. A product is protected by a patent within the meaning of Article 3(a) of that regulation if, on the priority date of the patent, it would have been obvious to a person skilled in the art that the active ingredient in question was specifically and precisely identifiable in the wording of the claims of the basic patent. In the case of a combination of active ingredients, each active ingredient in that combination must be specifically, precisely and individually identifiable in the wording of the claims of the basic patent. (Emphasis added).

Applied to SPC No. 05C0032, the Advocate General is thus of the opinion that “It would appear, subject once again to verification by the referring court, that, on 26 July 1996, the claimed priority date of the patent at issue in the main proceedings, it would not have been obvious to a person skilled in the art that the active ingredient emtricitabine was specifically and precisely identifiable in the wording of the claims of that patent” (emphasis added).

Of course the opinion of the Advocate is not binding on the CJEU, but at present it appears there isn’t much suspense left for the third round.


CASE REFERENCE: Tribunal de grande instance de Paris, 3ème chambre, 2ème section, May 25, 2018, SAS Mylan v. Gilead Sciences Inc. et al., RG No. 16/14214.