Copy and paste

What is new in today’s post? Well, strictly nothing. Nope, nothing new under the sun. 

In fact, the recent ruling by the Cour d’appel de Paris in Avery Dennison RIS France & Avery Dennison Sytèmes d’étiquetage France v. Directeur général de l’INPI is pretty much a copy and paste of Free & Freebox v. Directeur général de l’INPI issued a few months ago and already reported on here.

So is there really a need to discuss it? After all, case law is more interesting when it tackles new issues or when it features a change in practice.

But the point is, sometimes even established case law can be somewhat questionable from a practitioner’s perspective. And in this case, I must say I struggle with fully understanding the court’s reiterated rationale.

Copying an IP judgment – a paradox?

The issue at stake is the limitation of a patent in front of the INPI (which is the French patent and trademark office), and which options are available to third parties to challenge this limitation. Appeals against decisions issued by the INPI are generally supposed to be lodged with the Paris Cour d’appel. Accordingly, a number of third parties have tried to challenge decisions of limitation of patents in front of the Cour d’appel, by directly appealing these decisions – oftentimes parallel to ongoing litigation. And they have lost, their appeals being deemed inadmissible. The present case is no exception.

In particular, the Paris Cour d’appel (with the support of the Cour de cassation in Teisseire v. Directeur général de l’INPI) has consistently held that challenges against the limited claims must be brought in the context of a nullity lawsuit. This means that such challenges have to be brought in front of the Paris Tribunal de grande instance (TGI), not the Cour d’appel.

But here is the thing. Grounds for nullity are supposed to be listed in a limitative manner in the law, be it in article L. 613-25 Code de la propriété intellectuelle (CPI) for French patents, or in article L. 614-12 CPI together with article 138 of the European patent convention (EPC) as far as French parts of European patents are concerned. These grounds of nullity notably comprise lack of novelty, lack of inventive step, insufficiency of disclosure, extension of subject-matter beyond the contents of the application as filed and extension of the scope of protection after grant.

What the statutory grounds for nullity do not comprise is lack of compliance with article 84 EPC (or its equivalent in the CPI), per which the claims “shall be clear and concise and be supported by the description” is not a ground for nullity. Just like a lack of clarity is not a ground for opposition at the EPO either.

Nevertheless, when the INPI examines a request for limitation, they are supposed to check whether the claims as limited are clear and concise and supported by the description. See article L. 613-45 CPI together with article L. 612-6 CPI.

The question is whether and how third parties may challenge the result of this part of the examination conducted by the INPI.

If we turn to the parallel situation of limitation proceedings at the EPO, the answer is clear. Only parties to the proceedings can file an appeal against a decision issued by the EPO. A third party, as its name indicates, is not a party to the limitation proceedings and thus cannot appeal the decision of limitation, even if they deem that the limited claims are e.g. unclear.

In France, third party appeals are not ruled out as a matter of principle. By way of example, it is relatively common for a third party to challenge a decision of restoration of a patent by the INPI. See an example here.

But when it comes to decisions of limitation, third party appeals are usually stroke out in view of the arguments raised by the appellant.

In the present case, the French part of a European patent was limited by Gemalto, parallel to ongoing patent infringement proceedings against two companies of the Avery Dennison group. Avery Dennison appealed the decision of limitation and argued (among others) that the claims as limited are unclear.

The Cour d’appel rejected the appeal as inadmissible and held in particular that: 

[…] The arguments by Avery Dennison supporting their request for cancellation of the decision of the general director of the INPI, per which the claims as limited are not clear and not supported by the description, are analyzed as arguments of invalidity of the patent enforced against them in the framework of the infringement suit. These arguments, which put into question the limitation itself, i.e. whether the modified claims comply with the law, pertain to the jurisdiction of the judge in charge of assessing the validity of the patent. In this case, there is a counterclaim for nullity of the claims of the […] patent pending in front of this judge. His jurisdiction extends to all patent validity challenges, be it arguments of extension of an absence of limitation or arguments of a lack of clarity of the claims or a lack of support in the description, which are indeed exceptions which can lead to the nullity of a patent

Just to be very clear on this: I perfectly understand that it may make a lot of sense for the same court (the TGI) to be in charge of assessing all challenges against the patent claims.

What I do not understand is the last sentence in the above quote. In other terms, why does the Cour d’appel deem that a lack of clarity of the claims or a lack of support in the description, can lead to the nullity of the patent? 

I can come up with three possible explanations. 

Option 1: the court simply did not (does not) understand that not all conditions to be examined before granting limited claims can be challenged after the limitation, based on the listed grounds of nullity. I think this is unlikely, because the point has certainly been explained to the court time and time again in this case and previous similar ones.

Admittedly, it is probably easy to confuse a lack of support in the description (not a ground for nullity) with insufficiency of disclosure (ground for nullity). Both concepts are quite close, as explained in section F-IV, 6.4 of the EPO guidelines for examination. Actually, lack of support can also be easily confused with extension of subject-matter.

But lack of clarity on the other hand is quite clearly different from insufficiency of disclosure, or any other ground for nullity for that matter.

Option 2: the court deems that judges have such a large discretion in examining the actual grounds for nullity, such as insufficiency of disclosure or even lack of novelty, that they can very well revoke a patent under one of these statutory grounds if there is a lack of clarity in the claims.

This would be a pragmatic approach but not a satisfactory one on the legal standpoint. The legislator purposefully set out a number of distinct requirements to be handled differently. So why should judges be allowed to blur the lines between them?

Option 3: the court believes that all statutory conditions may be examined in the context of a nullity claim or counterclaim, including clarity and conciseness mentioned in article 84 EPC or article L. 612-6 CPI.

This would be a very bold position, since, at least as far as European patents are concerned, article 138 EPC provides that “a European patent may be revoked with effect for a Contracting State only on the grounds that“, and then comes a list of grounds which does not contain lack of clarity and conciseness.

But let’s explore option 3 a little bit more.

If this is indeed what the court has in mind, is this situation specific to limited patents? Does it also extend to patents modified in opposition at the EPO? Or has lack of clarity now also become a ground for nullity for all patents, even those which were not modified after grant?

Dear readers, please feel free to provide more information or to speculate as to yet further possibilities not contemplated here…

One other argument which – as far as I understand – was raised in the appeal, was that the modified claims were not a limitation. Here, the court’s position seems to be that modified claims necessarily lead to a limitation of the scope (and thus are allowable) or to an extension of the scope (and thus can be revoked in a nullity challenge).

But aren’t there yet other situations in which the modified claims could result neither in a limited scope nor in an extended scope? What about for example claims which are modified only to provide some clarification? In such a scenario, shouldn’t a third party be allowed to challenge the decision of limitation per se? After all, the INPI is supposed to only grant actual limitations, not clarifications. And if no extension of scope results from the modification, it should not be possible to challenge it in a nullity suit, oder?

I must admit that this latter question is trickier. But at least the main point raised above really needs to be clarified once and for all.


CASE REFERENCE: Cour d’appel de Paris, pôle 5 chambre 2, February 10, 2017, Avery Dennison RIS France & Avery Dennison Systèmes d’Etiquetage France v. Directeur général de l’INPI, RG No.15/25007.

Clean sweep

There are at least three interesting aspects in today’s decision, as well as a sort of infuriating one. The interesting points are limitation, public prior use and inventive step. The infuriating one is a mistake made by the court, which stumbled over dependent claims – despite vocal criticisms of this type of mistakes made by various commentators over the years.

But before I address these points in turn, a few words on the background. The claimant in this case is Concept Microfibre, a French company specialized in microfiber textiles, as its name suggests. They own two French patents filed on the same day, FR 2926204 (FR’204) and FR 2926205 (FR’205).

In 2012, Concept Microfibre sued another French company Distribution de Matériel Européen (DME) as well as its Italian mother company, Filmop, for infringement of the two French patents. Further to the classical nullity counter strikes, the Paris Tribunal de grande instance (TGI) revoked claims 1, 2 and 3 of FR’205 (which were relied upon by the patent proprietor) in its judgment dated July 3, 2014; but the other patent FR’204 was upheld, and the defendants were found liable for infringement.

They appealed, which leads us to the judgment of September 27, 2016 by the Paris Cour d’appel.

On appeal, the patentee did not fight the revocation of claims 1, 2 and 3 of FR’205 by the TGI. So, this was quite easy to deal with for the appeal judges, and this part of the TGI decision was confirmed. What was more challenging for the court was to handle the other patent FR’204.

The first challenge was that the FR’204 patent was limited during the appeal proceedings, or more precisely at the onset of the appeal proceedings. The appeal was lodged on August 27, 2014, and a request for limitation of FR’204 was filed less than 2 months later, on October 16, 2014, at the INPI (French patent and trademark office). The limitation was accepted by the INPI on January 9, 2015.

The limitation consisted in combining claim 1 with claims 2 and 4.

The alleged infringers claimed that this limitation was invalid, because the limitation was requested “in order to adapt the right so as to escape a looming revocation” (uh, yes, that’s kind of the whole point of limitation proceedings) “and so as to harmonize it with the features of the products that they market” (right, too bad the patentee did not add a feature clearly not present in the alleged infringing products).

The alleged legal basis for the invalidity of the limitation was the legal principle “fraus omnia corrumpit“.

As much as I like Latin phrases, especially when I happen to know what they mean, the argument was clearly a long shot. The court easily concluded that the limitation was neither fraudulent nor improper, and that the defendants had had enough time to challenge the validity of the limited claims.

What I do find puzzling in this limitation case, though, is why the claims were limited in the first place. Usually, claims are limited on appeal when the patent is revoked in first instance (see a recent example in the Orange v. Free litigation). But in this case the patent was upheld in first instance.

Did the appellants immediately file submissions together with their appeal of August 27, 2014, and did these submissions contain new arguments which appeared more serious and threatening to the patentee? It is possible, but we cannot know for sure as the file wrapper is not part of the public record.

As far as I can tell, no new prior art was cited on appeal.

On the other hand, it seems that the appellants developed a proper argumentation of lack of inventive step, which was not the case in first instance.

In first instance, it looks like the defendants were so confident with their lack of novelty attack that they did not really focus on inventive step. Thus, the TGI simply discarded the inventive step attack by noting that:

regarding the first part of the characterizing portion [of the claim], the defendants did not make any observation on its inventive character and on the approach that the skilled person would have to make this composition and its particular structure. 

So I can only speculate that a convincing argument of lack of inventive step was newly introduced very early on appeal, which led to the limitation – unless readers have other ideas?

Anyway, the proprietor may actually have underestimated the new argument in spite, as the main claim as limited was ultimately found not to be inventive by the court!

The claim at stake was the following:

Cleaning cloth, in particular for cleaning the floor, intended to be carried by a broom, said cloth having a cleaning surface intended to come into contact with the floor, said cleaning surface comprising a textile composition made of polyolefine, and a textile composition made of hydrophilic microfibers, characterized in that:

– each of said textile composition made of polyolefine and said textile composition made of hydrophilic microfibers comprises a thread extending towards the cleaning surface, 

– the titer of the thread of said textile composition made of polyolefine is greater than the titer of the thread of said textile composition made of hydrophilic microfibers, 

– the first textile composition defines scrubbing areas and the second textile composition defines absorption areas, and

– on the cleaning surface, the textile composition made of polyolefine is slightly below the textile composition made of hydrophilic microfibers.

Brooms are not just useful for scrubbing and absorbing fluids.
Brooms are not just useful for scrubbing and absorbing fluids.

The court relied on an EPO-like approach to assess inventive step, in particular with respect to the definition of the closest prior art:

the closest prior art which is selected must be relevant, that is it must correspond to a similar use and must require the fewest structural and functional modifications to arrive at the claimed invention; said closest prior art must therefore have the same purpose or effect as the invention or at least belong to the same technical field as the claimed invention or a closely related field. 

The court identified the technical problem addressed in the patent as improving the efficacy of cleaning cloths both for scrubbing dirt and for absorbing fluids, owing to the two textile compositions. Then, the court identified three relevant documents which could represent the closest prior art, without really singling out one among the three. They all belonged to the same technical field although their purpose was slightly different (namely, the prior art cloths were intended for sweeping, not scrubbing).

The court then held that all claimed features could be found in various prior art documents. As far as I understand:

  • Two Korean documents both taught two textile compositions, one made of hard polyolefine fibers (suitable for scrubbing) and one made of hydrophilic fibers (suitable for absorbing fluids), the titer of the former being greater than the titer of the latter.
  • A PCT application disclosed distinct areas, with fibers made of a single thread extending towards the cleaning surface.
  • Finally, a U.S. patent disclosed a cloth made of fabric comprising thread loops of different lengths depending on their purpose (absorption of dirt for the longer loops and absorption of liquid for the shorter ones).

The court did not explicitly state that all these documents could be combined due to a “partial problem” approach, but this is probably what they more or less had in mind. At any rate, they noted that the claimed invention:

does not contravene any prejudice, does not represent any breakthrough relative to the methods already taught, does not overcome any technical difficulty and does not provide any unexpected or surprising result. 

On the face of it, and with the important caveat that I have not examined the prior art nor the submissions of the parties (which are not public), this conclusion seems to make sense.

On the other hand, what makes absolutely no sense is that one of the dependent claims was then revoked for lack of novelty:

Claim 5 recites that the polyolefine is polypropylene, but this claim lacks novelty, since claim 1 of Korean patent 10-0718962 already discloses fibers areas made of polypropylene. 

It is unfortunately relatively common for our judges to get dependent claims wrong. Here, the court apparently focused only on the features contained in claim 5, without realizing that these features should be read in combination with those of claim 1. If claim 1 is novel, then claim 5 is also novel. It can at best lack inventive step, like claim 1.

By the way, the frequency of this type of error regarding dependent claims is probably a factor to be taken into account by patent proprietors when determining their litigation strategy. If you know that your main claim is weak, it is probably better to amend it by way of a limitation rather than assume that a stronger dependent claim will survive if the main claim is revoked. Of course, that can happen, but you’d better not count on it.

As mentioned at the beginning of the post, the way the court handled the public prior use defense was also interesting, I will try to address it in another post.


CASE REFERENCE: Cour d’appel de Paris, pôle 5, chambre 1, September 27, 2016, Filmop Srl & SASU Distribution de Matériel Européen v. SAS Concept Microfibre, RG No. 14/18000.

Orange on a new track

One of the first posts of this blog was dedicated to a prominent lawsuit between two telecom operators, Orange and Free. As was reported at the time, Orange claimed infringement of the French part of its European patent EP 2044797.

Orange lost in first instance, as the Paris Tribunal de grande instance (TGI) revoked the patent in a judgment dated June 18, 2015. Some of the claims were found to lack novelty, while others were found to be directed to computer programs as such, i.e. were found not to be directed to patent-eligible subject-matter.

Orange lodged an appeal against this decision on July 27, 2015 – which as far as I can tell is still pending. However, there was an interesting side development, which leads me to today’s discussion.

On August 26, 2015, Orange filed a request for limitation of the French part of the European patent at stake. This is now a classical move in patent litigation in this country: amending claims so as to render a nullity challenge moot. Since the confirmation rate at the appeal stage is relatively high, the limitation of a patent after a revocation in first instance is sometimes the only way to shake things up for the patentee.

On September 2, the Institut National de la Propriété Industrielle (INPI) accepted the request for limitation. This is only one week after the request was submitted. This is fast, isn’t it? As in light’s speed fast, actually. A centralized limitation of the patent at the European patent office (EPO) would certainly have taken much longer, at least several months. This is certainly a strong incentive for going the national way when considering the limitation of a patent.

Free, the alleged infringer and nullity claimant, that prevailed in first instance, lodged an appeal against the limitation decision. Appeals against decisions issued by the INPI are handled by the Paris Cour d’appel. In this case, the appeal gave rise to two judgments, both dated September 9, 2016.

Why two judgments? Well, part of the case made by Free was that several provisions of the Code de la propriété intellectuelle (CPI) are contrary to the French constitution. This what is called a QPC, which stands for “question prioritaire de constitutionnalité” (or priority constitutionality question). QPCs are referred to the Conseil constitutionnel – which is our supreme court for constitutional issues – but only after passing two filters. The first filter is that the court to which the QPC is submitted must accept to forward the QPC to the Cour de cassation or the Conseil d’Etat (respectively judicial supreme court and administrative supreme court). The second filter is that the Cour de cassation or the Conseil d’Etat must then accept to forward the QPC to the Conseil constitutionnel.

The QPC system is out of the scope of the present post. It will suffice to say that in the present litigation the QPC was handled separately from the rest of the case, hence the two judgments.

The constitution - beautiful as a pyramid. But wait - this is not the right constitution is it?
The constitution – beautiful as a pyramid. But wait – this is not the right constitution is it?

However, the outcome was similar as both Free’s appeal per se and its QPC were held inadmissible.

There are not many details in both judgments regarding Free’s arguments on the merits. It is simply stated that they claimed there was “an absence of clarity and concision of the limitation, which, in the absence of a corresponding description, is not a limitation“.

The court discarded these objections to the limitation with the following paragraph:

[…] The arguments made by Free and Freebox in favor of their request for cancellation of the decision of the INPI’s director can in fact be analyzed as arguments of nullity of the patent which is asserted against them in the context of the infringement suit […]. These arguments intend to call into question the limitation itself, namely the conformity of the amended claims to the applicable legal provisions. They pertain to the jurisdiction of the judge in charge of controlling patent validity, which in this case is actually already involved. This jurisdiction extends to arguments relating to an alleged extension as well as relating to a lack of clarity of the claims or their absence of support in the description. 

This finding will not come as a surprise to all those familiar with previous case law on limitation proceedings. It is consistent with a number of previous rulings. Courts are not keen on allowing appeals against national limitation decisions; they believe that whether the limitation complies with the requirements of the CPI should be handled in the context of a nullity action or claim.

However, to some extent this established case law is problematic, as many observers have long realized. Indeed, grounds for nullity (be it of a French patent or a French part of a European patent) include inter alia lack of novelty, lack of inventive step, insufficiency of disclosure, extension of subject-matter and extension of the scope of protection. This list of grounds for nullity is provided in article L. 613-25 CPI for French patents and article 138 EPC for European patents (to which article L. 614-12 CPI makes reference).

However, a lack of clarity or concision of the claims, or a lack of support of the claims by the description, are not grounds for nullity. All European practitioners know very well that lack of clarity or support by the description are not grounds for opposition at the EPO – well the same is true of grounds for nullity.

On the other hand, clarity, conciseness and support by the description are requirements which are to be taken into account in examination proceedings but are not supposed to be reviewed in a nullity suit.

Importantly, these requirements are also taken into account during limitation proceedings – which may be viewed as a partial reopening of examination. This is true of centralized limitation at the EPO, but also of national limitation. See in particular article L. 613-45 CPI, which sets a number of conditions to be examined by the INPI when a request for limitation is filed:

[…] If, when the limitation is requested, the amended claims are not a limitation with respect to the previous claims of the patent, or if they do not meet the requirements of article L. 612-6, this is notified in a substantiated manner to the petitioner. A time limit is set to regularize the request or file observations. If there are no regularization and no observations overcoming the objection, the request is rejected by a decision of the director of the INPI. […]

As for article L. 612-6 referred to above, it reads:

The claims define the subject-matter of the protection which is requested. They must be clear and concise and be supported by the description. 

Therefore, it seems that clarity, conciseness, and support by the description are legal requirements that the INPI must check when examining a request for limitation. And those are not grounds for nullity. Thus, if amended claims that are unclear, lack conciseness, or are unsupported by the description (which is not the same as covering subject-matter extending beyond the contents of the application as filed) are nevertheless accepted by the INPI, it would make sense to be able to challenge the work done by the INPI in the context of an appeal against the limitation decision.

But the Cour d’appel, in this case like in previous ones, said this was the job of the judges in charge of the nullity complaint. Therefore, we can only hope that, for reasons of consistency, those judges will actually and seriously review compliance of the amended claims with article L. 612-6 CPI – even if it is not part of the official list of grounds of nullity…

Another argument made by Free was that a number of provisions of the CPI contravene non only our constitution, but also article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) on fair trial. The court noted that the objection based on article 6 ECHR was actually the same as the objection which gave rise to the QPC. Thus:

First, the INPI is an administrative public institution which cannot be subjected to all rules on fair trial. Second, it was already stated that this [QPC] is the subject-matter of a distinct procedure registered under number RG 15/24934 and is dealt with in another judgment also issued today. Free and Freebox can therefore not ask the court to decide on a question which they request should be examined first by the Conseil constitutionnel. 

If I understand the first sentence in this paragraph, I cannot help wondering about the second part. If my law school memories are correct, the Conseil constitutionnel does not control compliance of French laws with the ECHR or any other international treaty. This task is left to judicial and administrative judges. It seems that Free’s objections to the law were basically the same from the viewpoint of the ECHR and of the French constitution. But there were apparently two distinct legal bases for the objections, and I wonder whether it was correct to lump them together.

So, let’s move on with the second judgment on the QPC. The legal provisions which were challenged in the QPC were articles L. 613-24, L. 613-25 and L. 614-12 CPI. The first one is the main legal provision allowing a patentee to request a limitation of its patent. The second one contains the grounds for nullity of a French patent and specifies that the patent may be limited in the course of a nullity action. The third one provides that the grounds for nullity of a European patent are set forth in article 138 EPC and that it is possible to limit the patent in the course of a nullity action. According to Free, these articles breach fundamental rights enshrined in the constitution, including the right to a fair trial.

What was the court’s reaction? Well it simply dismissed the QPC by noting that

the admissibility of the [QPC] which is raised in the course of the appeal against the decision of the INPI of September 2, 2015 depends on the admissibility of said appeal.

Since the appeal was dismissed as inadmissible, as noted above, the QPC was therefore also held inadmissible.

This is a little bit of a vicious circle. According to this reasoning, how can one possibly challenge the constitutionality of a legal provision which makes an appeal inadmissible?

We will see what happens in case Free raises the QPC again in the course of the appeal proceedings in the merits.

As a last word, it may be interesting to look at the claims as limited, which can be found here on the online register. Claims 1, 4, 9 and 11 were modified by the insertion of a number of additional features.

Also, claims 12 to 15 directed to a software product and to a support for the software were deleted. Those were the claims which were found in first instance to relate to excluded subject-matter.

The deletion of these claims looks like a good move, strategically speaking. But it is too bad that we will not get the Cour d’appel’s take on the patentability of claims directed to “software products” as well as software supports.


CASE REFERENCES: Cour d’appel de Paris, Pôle 5 chambre 2, September 9, 2016, Free & Freebox v. Directeur général de l’INPI & Orange, RG No. 15/21319; and Cour d’appel de Paris, Pôle 5 chambre 2, September 9, 2016, Free & Freebox v. Directeur général de l’INPI & Orange, RG No. 15/24934.

Getting a handle on limitation

Last week’s post was about a famous chemical case which found its way up to the Cour de cassation twice, due to a tricky limitation issue combined with a tricky SPC issue.

Today, I would like to reassure readers versed in the mechanical arts. Yes, they too are entitled to get some fun with fancy limitation questions.

The case at hand relates to French patent No. FR 2843372 (FR’372), which is concerned with a sales display pack for door or window handles. The patent proprietor Société de Fonderie du Centre (SOFOC) has apparently had a complicated relationship with DIY store chain Bricorama over the past twenty years. A recent episode of their hectic partnership is an infringement lawsuit brought by SOFOC against Bricorama based on FR’372.

Interestingly, the legal action was started only one month after a limitation of the patent was granted by the INPI (French patent office).

Bricorama counterclaimed for invalidity – why would they not – and my focus will be on their argument that some of the patent claims were invalid due to extension of the scope of protection after grant, further to the alleged “limitation” of the patent. Speaking EPO language, this would be an “Art.123(3) objection“.

The patent as granted comprised a main claim and seven dependent claims. Claim 1 read as follows:

Sales display pack for door or window handles comprising a finger-plate and a lever-handle, characterized in that it is composed firstly of cardboard folded on itself in two flaps, a presentation flap and a back flap, and secondly means of attachment of the said handle(s) to be presented on said cardboard fitting into cut-outs formed in said cardboard, the said cardboard comprising two fixing cut-outs formed facing each other on the two flaps, at least four cut-outs for attachment of the handle(s) to the said display pack, said cut-outs being formed facing each other in pairs in the two flaps and at least one cut-out formed on the presentation flap, in which a transparent compartment is placed for containing assembly accessories for the presented handle(s).

After the limitation, claim 1 was worded as follows (the highlighted expressions corresponding to added features):

Sales display pack for door or window handles comprising a finger-plate and a lever-handle, characterized in that it is composed firstly of cardboard folded on itself in two flaps, a presentation flap and a back flap, and secondly means of attachment of two handles to be presented on said cardboard fitting into cut-outs formed in said cardboard, so that the finger-plates rest against the presentation flap, said cardboard comprising two fixing cut-outs formed facing each other on the two flaps, at least four cut-outs for attachment of the two handles to the said display pack, said cut-outs being formed facing each other in pairs in the two flaps and at least one cut-out formed on the presentation flap, in which a transparent compartment is placed for containing assembly accessories for the presented handles.

It was not challenged that amended claim 1 was more restricted than claim 1 as granted.

The issue was that, together with the amendment of claim 1, the patent proprietor had also filed five brand new claims 9 to 13 which, they said, were merely dependent claims.

New claim 9 was worded as follows (the highlighted portions being in my view the most important ones):

A set of two door or window handles attached to a sales display pack, each handle comprising a finger-plate and a lever-handle, characterized in that the sales display pack is composed of cardboard folded on itself in two flaps, a presentation flap and a back flap, and secondly means of attachment of the two handles fitting into cut-outs formed in said cardboard, the finger-plates resting against the presentation flap, said cardboard comprising two fixing cut-outs formed facing each other on the two flaps, at least four cut-outs for attachment of the two handles to said display pack, said cut-outs being formed facing each other in pairs in the two flaps and at least one cut-out formed on the presentation flap, in which a transparent compartment is placed for containing assembly accessories for the presented handles, the sales display pack being according to one of claims 1 to 8.

The following new claims 10 to 13 were also directed to a set of handles attached to a sales display pack, making reference to claim 9. For the defendant, claim 9 was an independent claim, and not a mere dependent claim as advocated by the plaintiff. They also argued that claims 9 to 13 extended the scope of protection of the patent and were thus invalid.

Fancy handles are best displayed in their natural environment.
Fancy handles are best displayed in their natural environment.

The Tribunal de grande instance (TGI) ruled in the defendant’s favor:

It is true that claim 9 repeats the wording of claim 1 regarding the definition of the sales display pack, but it is directed to “a set of two door or window handles characterized in that the handles are attached to a sales display pack”. Now, claim 1 only relates to the sales display pack which supports the handles, and not to the set composed of these distinct elements. The scope of protection under Article L. 612-6 of the Code de la propriété intellectuelle, restricted to the sales display pack in claim 1, is extended in claim 9 to a different product made of the combination of the handles and previously characterized sales display pack. Claim 9 adds relative to the features of claim 1 and concerns a distinct subject-matter, whereas claims 10 to 13, which are mere embodiments of claim 9, depend on it. 

With this assessment of the nature of claim 9, it comes as no surprise that the TGI found that there had been an extension of the scope of protection:

[…] Article L. 613-24 of the Code de la propriété intellectuelle mentions limitation only as far as claims are modified. Per se, the addition of 5 dependent claims cannot be analyzed as a modification of preexisting claims. In fact, [SOFOC] does not contend that going from 8 to 13 claims would be the result of a mere redrafting of the initial claims 1 to 8, which remain unchanged – with the exception of the definition of the number of handles supported by the sales display pack. 

Moreover, it is now acknowledged that claim 9 does not simply repeat the features of claims 1 to 8 but includes a set made of the sales display pack and two handles in the scope of protection conferred by the patent. Even if it is clear that the description relates to a sales display pack intended for supporting door or window handles, it does absolutely not institute the combination of the two elements of the invention, and by the way the sole drawing of the patent does not show the handles. The latter are only mentioned in the description in order to understand the purpose of the sales display pack, which is the sole subject-matter of the invention. Also, the modification of claim 1 was sufficient to limit the protection to a sales display pack intended for supporting two door or window handles, without any need for the addition of 5 new claims. Thus, independent claim 9 and dependent claims 10 to 13 involve a broadening of the scope of protection conferred by the patent, which in fact would have had a significant impact on a possible damages computation, to a new object not comprised in the description and in the features of initial claims 1 to 8. They are therefore invalid.

In summary, the amendment was objectionable on two grounds.

First, limitation proceedings are not meant to add claims, but rather to modify and more precisely restrict existing claims. This seems to be in keeping with the Guidelines for examination in the EPO (section D-X, 4.3):

Likewise, adding dependent claims in limitation is not permissible if not directly caused by the limitation introduced in the claims.

In the present case, the addition of the supplemental claims seems to have been uncorrelated to the modification of claim 1 and thus unjustified.

The second ground retained by the judges is that new claim 9 and its dependent claims covered a different object from the one covered in the patent as granted. This is probably a more controversial point. For one thing, the TGI analyzed claim 9 as an independent claim, even though it explicitly refers to claims 1 to 8 and includes all the limitations of these preceding claims. This appraisal may not be fully consistent with the definition of independent and dependent claims provided in section F-IV, 3.4 of the Guidelines for examination in the EPO.

But, more importantly, the combination of a sales display pack and two handles, recited in claim 9, was considered as a different object (an aliud) in comparison with the sales display pack as such recited in claims 1 to 8. This approach is comparable to that adopted by the INPI in the Syngenta case discussed last week: the INPI considered that adding a second active substance to a claim directed to a fungicide composition comprising a first active substance resulted in a shift of the scope of protection towards a different object. As explained in the post, the Cour de cassation finally rejected the objection in Syngenta. But did they fully weigh all relevant factors? One cannot really tell based on the brief and cryptic reasons for the decision.

There are, to my mind, valuable reasons for making a distinction between (A) further restricting some features of a claimed object; and (B) adding a supplemental object in a claim. If case (A) undoubtedly corresponds to a real limitation, case (B) is not so simple, as it may in some instances pave the way for a new contributory infringement complaint, or for an increase in the amount of damages, as rightly noted by the court in the above citation – in addition to also making it theoretically possible to extend the duration of protection in the pharmaceutical or phytosanitary field, by way of an SPC application, as discussed last week.

A somewhat more indirect parallel can also be made with the Nespresso judgment discussed in a previous post. The TGI had objected to the presence of a claim directed to a device for the extraction of a capsule, plus the capsule itself, in combination, while the application as filed focused on the device without presenting the capsule as part of the invention. In this case, the nullity ground was extension of subject-matter beyond the contents of the application as filed, and not extension of the scope of protection after grant. But the underlying idea is similar.

A common feature of NespressoSyngenta and Bricorama is that the patent proprietor tried to change the focus of the invention after the filing date in order to gain a particular legal advantage. In all three cases, the judges thwarted the patentees’ strategy:

  • In Nespresso, the combination claim was introduced at a late stage during examination proceedings (after the issuance of the communication on the intent to grant by the EPO) presumably specifically in order to make it possible to sue capsule manufacturers. The combination claim was viewed by the French judges as improperly adding matter.
  • In Syngenta, a dependent claim was limited after grant in the hope of making it compliant with the Medeva standards, as a basis for a combo SPC application. The Cour de cassation validated the limitation but the SPC application was rejected all the same, and the rejection was confirmed by the Cour d’appel.
  • In Bricorama, new claims were added by way of limitation proceedings a few weeks before launching an infringement action, potentially modifying the quantum of damages. Those claims were revoked.

Could it be that courts are not that keen on too smart patentees?

As a final note, SOFOC did not have such a bad time in court after all. Having revoked claims 9 to 13, the court also revoked claims 1 to 4 (for lack of inventive step) but then held that dependent claims 5 to 8 were valid and infringed. This certainly made the judgment much easier for SOFOC to ahem… handle.


CASE REFERENCE: Tribunal de grande instance de Paris, 3ème chambre, 1ère section, May 21, 2015, Société de Fonderie du Centre SA v. Bricorama France SAS & Bricorama SA, RG No. 2014/02007.

Fungicides Ltd.

National limitation is a much appreciated tool of patent owner litigants in France. In particular, when they are faced with a serious validity challenge, it is often a good option for them to file a request for limitation at the INPI (French patent office) in order to amend their claims – although there may be more unusual reasons for filing a request for limitation, as we will see below.

Limitation proceedings are cheap and generally straightforward, and to some extent there can be more flexibility in terms of allowable claim amendments than at the European patent office. However, when a limitation starts going south, well it can go way south.

This is precisely what happened in a famous Syngenta case. Syngenta prevailed in the end (at least on the limitation aspect of the case), but not without having to plead its case in front of the Cour de cassation (French judicial supreme court) – twice!

This Syngenta case relates to European patent No. EP 0382375 (EP’375), which is directed to fungicides. Claim 1 of the patent as granted relates to a large class of chemical compounds defined according to a Markush formula. Claim 8 of the patent as granted is worded as follows:

A fungicidal composition comprising a fungicidally effective amount of a compound according to claim 1 and a fungicidally acceptable carrier or diluent therefor.

On September 28, 2009, the patent proprietor filed a request for limitation of the French national part of the patent, at the INPI. They requested that claim 8 be amended so as to recite a composition comprising, in addition to a fungicidally effective amount of a compound according to claim 1 and a fungicidally acceptable carrier or diluent, a second active compound selected from the group consisting of (i) fungicide compounds selected from a first list, (ii), insecticide compounds selected from a second list and (iii) plant growth regulator compounds selected from a third list.

The INPI director refused the request for limitation on May 6, 2010, and Syngenta appealed. Appeals against decisions by the INPI director must be brought in front of the Cour d’appel de Paris. On September 7, 2011, the court sided with the INPI director and dismissed the appeal.

The court stated as follows:

[…] The INPI director exactly analyzed the scope of the requested modification and rightly noted that it did not result in specifying the composition of the product mentioned in the initial version of claim 8 by restricting it to a list of possible combinations, but on the contrary had the effect of adding to this product a new active selected from a large list, actually offering an immense scope of new possible combinations. 

[…] He rightly noted that the proposed modification adds to the compound with the carrier or diluent according to claim 1 recited in the initial text another compound although neither the claim sought to be modified nor any other claim mentions a compound comprising a second active compound.

I think it is fair to summarize this view as meaning that the modified version of claim 8 was directed to a different product (an aliud), namely a combination of two active compounds whereas the invention claimed in the original patent was just one active compound with some appropriate inactive additives.

Syngenta did not retreat and filed a petition with the Cour de cassation (such petitions being restricted to points of law). This paid off, as the supreme court set aside the ruling from the Cour d’appel on March 19, 2013, holding in extremely concise if not cryptic terms – as always – that the appeal judges had erred by

not investigating whether the subject-matter in the modified claim was not directly and unambiguously disclosed in the description of the patent as granted.

By this, I assume it was meant that the Cour d’appel should not have focused on the claims as granted only, but should have looked for a possible support for the modified version of claim 8 in the description.

So, the case was remitted back to the Cour d’appel for further consideration. This led to a second ruling by the court on October 25, 2013, in which, this time, the limitation got the green light:

This limitation is thus directly and unambiguously supported by the […] initial description, literally copied, and it was thus disclosed.

[…]

This limitation therefore does not entail any broadening of infringement acts nor impinges on the protection of third parties. 

To translate this into EPO jargon, the subject-matter of the modified claim was found not to extend beyond the content of the application as filed (compliance with Art.123(2) EPC), and the modification was also found not to result in any extension of the scope of protection (compliance with Art.123(3) EPC).

Alas! It was the turn of the INPI director to be dissatisfied with the appeal judges, and to thus file another petition with the Cour de cassation. The INPI director (or rather the legal department of the INPI doing the work) may have decided that further judicial clarification was required before adapting the INPI practice for future cases.

On March 17, 2015, this petition was dismissed.

How did all these mushrooms grow from this bag? This mess would never have happened with the proper fungicide combination.
How on earth did all these mushrooms grow from this bag? This mess would never have happened with the proper fungicide combination.

Two points had been raised in the INPI director’s petition:

  • The proposed amendment of claim 8 resulted in a modification of the subject-matter of the patent, and a shift of protection.
  • It cannot be considered that there is direct and unambiguous disclosure in the description for the proposed new claim since there is not enough information for the skilled person to actually implement the claimed subject-matter. No combination of compounds was actually tested and the lists of second active substances in the description were merely of a speculative nature.

As to the latter point, the cassation judges simply noted that

the skilled person, who is a technician skilled in preparing fungicide compositions, does not need to carry out a research work as far as usual dosages for use are concerned

so that

the claimed combination was disclosed by the initial description. 

The theory put forward by the petitioner was that there can be no proper disclosure if the skilled person is not presented with sufficient information to carry out the invention. Readers familiar with EPO practice will immediately see that this theory, on the face of it, mixes up extension of subject-matter with insufficiency of disclosure, which are two distinct requirements under the EPC. Although this approach was certainly unorthodox, it may not have been flat-out absurd. After all, whether any new matter was added relative to the contents of the application as filed has to be appraised by the skilled person. Thus, it is at least arguable that a formal mention of a certain feature in a text could be disregarded by the skilled person as an actual disclosure, in case it does not represent a true technical teaching but rather a mere speculative statement.

The unorthodox theory was not endorsed by the Cour de cassation, but maybe because in this case there was no real insufficiency issue anyway. The way I understand the court’s position, finding out an appropriate dosage for the claimed composition was relatively straightforward and did not require any research program. Thus, the argument could be tried again in another case where there would be greater difficulties for the skilled person presented with a modified claim.

As to the first point in the INPI director’s petition, this was the objection which had prevailed in the first 2011 judgment before being overturned in 2013. The supreme court rejected it by noting that the judgment under appeal had simply applied the supreme court instructions provided in the first cassation judgment.

So, no real surprise there, but frankly I am not sure the Cour de cassation really addressed the central issue of whether the modification in claim 8 shifted the scope of protection towards an aliud or not.

The initial reaction of any practitioner is probably that, since claim 8 as granted had an open language (i.e. a composition “comprising” certain compounds), this claim covered all possible combinations including the compounds recited in the claim. Therefore, adding specific lists of partners into claim 8 necessarily restricts the claim and cannot broaden it.

But things might actually not be that simple. Schematically, claim 8 as granted protected a composition comprising an active A. By seeking to amend this claim to cover a composition comprising an active A in combination with an active B, the patent proprietor may have opened the door for a potential claim of contributory infringement against someone supplying active B to another person making the combination A + B.

The case law of the Boards of appeal seems to exclude this type of reasoning, as nicely summarized in section II.E.2.1.1 of the 2013 edition of the case law book:

In G 2/88 (OJ 1990, 93) it was clearly ruled that it is not necessary to consider the national laws of the contracting states in relation to infringement and that this issue is not relevant when deciding upon admissibility of an amendment under Art. 123(3) EPC. With respect to the question of an extension of the scope of protection under Art. 123(3) EPC, it is, rather, appropriate to take into account the fact that the protection conferred by a patent is determined by the terms of the claims, and in particular by the categories of the claims and their technical features, in accordance with Art. 69(1) EPC and its protocol (G 2/88, OJ 1990, 93).

But whether a national court should also exclude any infringement consideration when dealing with the admissibility of a request for limitation is questionable.

Also, the reason why Syngenta desperately wanted to modify claim 8 in the first place was because they had filed a phytosanitary SPC (Supplementary Protection Certificate) application for the commercial fungicide product based on the combination of the active substances azoxystrobin and folpel.

A first SPC had been granted for azoxystrobin itself based on the EP’375 patent. Azoxystrobin was one of the compounds encompassed by the Markush formula in claim 1. Syngenta then wanted to obtain a second SPC for the combination product.

The INPI director refused the second SPC application on September 2, 2009 since the combination product was not “covered” by the patent, since no claim recited a combination of actives. The refusal seems to be in keeping with the later Medeva CJEU ruling per which it is not possible to grant an SPC “relating to active ingredients which are not specified in the wording of the claims of the basic patent relied on“. Syngenta appealed and, a few weeks later, filed the request for limitation of claim 8, in order to introduce the second active compound, folpel, into claim 8, and thus try to circumvent the INPI’s objection.

However, the strategy failed, as the Cour d’appel de Paris confirmed the decision to refuse the second SPC application, on May 30, 2014. Said the court, the INPI director’s decision was correct in view of claim 8 as it stood at the time the decision was made. As a side note, another reason for refusing the SPC application, as of today, would be that it is not permissible to derive a single product SPC and a combination SPC from the same basic patent, as per the Actavis v. Boehringer Ingelheim CJEU ruling – but this is another story.

What I do find remarkable is that, by adding a supplemental active compound in a claim, it becomes theoretically possible to get additional patent protection via an SPC – in keeping with Medeva. Doesn’t this show that alleged limitations should be more scrupulously examined for potential side effects of extension of scope than under the Cour de cassation’s basic approach?


CASE REFERENCE: Cour de cassation, ch. com., March 17, 2015, Directeur Général de l’INPI v. Syngenta Ltd., appeal No. C/2013/28436