The dead line

There is something ominous about the word “deadline” in English.

It makes you suspect some dire background. And rightly so, according to some online resources, which mention a line that you would cross at the risk of losing your life.

The French word “délai” sounds much less sinister, but the consequences of missing a “délai” are pretty much the same as those of missing a “deadline“, as a recent decision of the Paris Cour d’appel reminds us.

In this case, a French patent application was filed on November 6, 2015, claiming the benefit of the filing date of an earlier French application, namely April 1, 2015. This is what is sometimes conveniently referred to as an “internal priority claim“.

One of the requirements of claiming an internal priority is that you must provide a copy of the initial patent application (plus you must identify the modifications made in the later filing). As the applicant failed to do so upon filing the later application, the INPI issued a communication dated August 9, 2016 and notified on August 16 to the representative, inviting the applicant to submit the missing copy within a two-month period.

The applicant still did not file the requested document, so that a decision to refuse the application was issued on November 4, 2016, and notified on November 10, 2016 to the representative.

On January 8, 2018, the applicant filed a request for restoration of its rights. On August 17, 2018, the INPI issued a negative decision, holding that the request for restoration was inadmissible as it was filed past the statutory deadline.

The applicant lodged an appeal in front of the Paris Cour d’appel, which resulted in a judgment dated November 5, 2019.

The key provision in this case is article L. 612-16 Code de la propriété intellectuelle:

The applicant who failed to comply with a deadline set by the [INPI] may file a request for restoration of its rights, if it has a legitimate excuse and if the non-compliance directly resulted in a refusal of the patent application or of a request, in the lapse of the patent application or patent, or in the loss of any other right. 

The appeal must be filed […] within a two-month deadline from the removal of the cause of non-compliance. The missing act must be performed within this deadline. The request is admissible only within a one-year deadline from the expiry of the missed deadline.

[…]

The main question is that of the starting point of the one-year deadline. The INPI currently considers (and this is reflected in its Guidelines for examination, section E.3.3.1.b, Oct. 2019 edition) that the “missed deadline” starting point is the “initially missed deadline”.

As a side note, this did not appear in the previous versions of the Guidelines – I suspect that they may have been modified based on the present case.

Here, the applicant was notified on August 16, 2016 of the invitation to file the copy of the earlier filing. The deadline for filing this copy expired on October 17, 2016. The INPI thus deemed that the one-year restoration deadline expired on October 17, 2017.

The talking calendar – the must-have gadget for handling your deadlines this year.

The applicant’s defense relied on the fact that there was another possible legal remedy, namely a request for further processing. See article R. 612-52 Code de la propriété intellectuelle:

If a patent application is refused or may be refused due to non-compliance with a time limit set by the [INPI], the refusal is not issued or is revoked if the applicant files a request for further processing. The request must be filed in writing within a two-month deadline from the communication of the refusal decision. The missing act must be performed within this deadline. The request is admissible only if the required fee is paid. 

Thus, the applicant argued that the missed deadline was the two-month further processing deadline, and not the initial two-month deadline starting from the INPI communication. The request for restoration was thus filed with respect to the further processing deadline.

This reasoning will probably sound familiar to many European readers, as this is exactly the approach used at the EPO.

Applying this reasoning to the facts at hand, the deadline for requesting further processing expired on January 10, 2017 (date of notification of the refusal decision + 2 months), and therefore the one-year restoration deadline expired on January 10, 2018 – so that the request for restoration was timely filed.

But the appeal judges did not follow this argumentation. They stuck to the INPI’s interpretation of L. 612-16 and considered that the missed deadline used as a starting point must be the initial missed deadline, and not the further processing missed deadline. The INPI’s decision was accordingly confirmed.

Don’t ask me for the reasons why they chose one interpretation over the other. They just did, and there is no actual justification in the judgment.

This is all the more unfortunate as the summary of the facts reveals that two interesting case law decisions were discussed by the petitioner: a cassation ruling dated April 15, 1986, and a later judgment of the Paris Cour d’appel dated January 14, 1987.

The petitioner argued that the INPI misinterpreted the 1986 cassation ruling – from which it can be inferred that this ruling was the basis for the INPI’s position.

The facts underlying the 1986 ruling are that a patent application was refused for failure to pay the grant fee; a request for restoration was filed but it was held inadmissible as it was filed more than one year after the expiry of the time limit for paying the grant fee. The petitioner tried to take advantage of an additional two-month period corresponding to the filing of a request for further processing – to no avail.

The cassation judges stated the following: 

The non-compliance of the deadline for the request for further processing is not excluded from the provisions of [what is now art. L.612-16]. But the provisions of [what is now art. R. 612-52] do not result in extending the one-year deadline set in the second paragraph of [what is now art. L.612-16]. The Cour d’appel held that, irrespective of the grounds for the request for restoration, it is only admissible within a one-year deadline from the final date on which the initially omitted act had to be performed, and therefore rightly justified its decision. 

This is quite clear, right? The one-year deadline must be computed from the expiry of the initial deadline. Well, not so fast.

Looking at the specifics of the case that led to the 1986 cassation ruling, it turns out that, in that case, the request for restoration had been filed with respect to the initial time limit (i.e. the time limit for paying the grant fee). It had not been filed with respect to the (missing) request for further processing. 

Let’s now turn to the second case discussed by the petitioner. It is an appeal judgment which was issued after the 1986 cassation ruling. In this case, it was also the grant fee which was not paid in time. But the difference is that the applicant filed a request for restoration with respect to the (missing) request for further processing.

And the appeal judges computed the one-year deadline from the expiry of the period for requesting further processing, not from the expiry of the initial deadline for paying the grant fee: 

[…] The petition is admissible as to time limits. Indeed, according to [what is now art. L.612-16] the time limit for filing a request for restoration is one year from the expiry of the deadline not complied with. The request for further processing was due by April 17, 1982, so that the time limit for filing the request for restoration expired on April 17, 1983. The request for restoration was filed on April 15, 1983.

In summary, reading between the lines, we have:

  • On the one hand, a 1986 cassation ruling which could at first sight be seen as supporting the INPI’s position, except that the facts were different and that the relevant statement in the ruling is ambiguous. There is a reference to “the initially omitted act” but it is unclear what we should make of it. The cassation judges did simply not have to decide on a request for restoration with respect to a request for further processing.
  • On the other hand, a 1987 appeal decision based on facts similar to the present facts, and that is manifestly contradictory with the decision commented on today.

It is thus a real pity that the Cour d’appel did not seriously address these issues. 

I would also add that, one a purely pragmatic standpoint, it seems to me that there may be some contradiction in the INPI’s approach (and in the court’s present approach) to this matter. Indeed, the INPI acknowledges that a request for restoration may be filed with respect to a missed deadline for a request for further processing. This is stated in the table that you can find on the last page of the Guidelines for examination.

But what is the point in requesting restoration of right with respect to the further processing deadline, if the one-year time limit is to be computed from the initial missed deadline? I cannot think of any situation in which requesting restoration with respect to the further processing deadline would then be of any use.

I would not like to conclude this post without wishing all readers a very happy new year.

I hope that I have not missed the deadline for doing so – but hey, I have always heard that it is all right to send your best wishes until January 31. This may not be true elsewhere, but as you can see there is some cultural specificity about French deadlines.


CASE REFERENCE: Cour d’appel de Paris, pôle 5 chambre 1, November 5, 2019, … v. Directeur Général de l’INPI, RG No. 18/20057.

Divide and not conquer

Many decisions that I have commented on relate to complex cases, involving multiple patents, or various actions in front of different courts, or endless back and forth bouncing between the Cour de cassation and the Cour d’appel.

So I am grateful, that, just this once, the mailman has delivered a short decision on a relatively simple legal point.

On March 21, 2008, Kubota Corporation filed a French patent application on a lawn mower, published as FR2915847.

On April 22, 2015, they filed a first divisional patent application, published as FR3019966.

On March 1, 2018, they filed a second divisional patent application. However, on August 27, 2018, the INPI (French patent office) refused this second divisional application as inadmissible.

The reason for the refusal was that the second divisional application was filed after the fee for grant for the grandparent application (FR’847) had been paid, back in April 2015.

Indeed, the INPI Guidelines for examination recite the following (section B.III.2):

A division can only be requested until the date of payment of the fee for grant and printing for the initial application. When this fee has already been paid or when the grant procedure has ended because of a refusal, withdrawal or lapse of the initial application, the division is refused. […]

When the division relates to a divisional application (B) stemming from an initial application (A), this control concerns application (A), and not divisional application (B)

French practice therefore differs from EPO practice.

At the EPO, you may file a second generation divisional application as long as the first generation divisional application is still pending, even if the grandparent application has already proceeded to grant. This is not possible according to the INPI guidelines.

Kubota filed an appeal against the refusal with the Paris Cour d’appel. They challenged the INPI’s interpretation of the statute.

The provision at stake is article R. 612-34 of the Code de la propriété intellectuelle:

Until the payment of the fee for grant and printing of the patent, the applicant may, on its own initiative, file divisional applications of its initial patent application. 

The key issue is how to understand to which application the time limit refers. The INPI’s position is that it is the original application in the family; whereas the appellant’s position is that it is rather the application from which a division is filed.

In this case, the fee for grant and printing for the first divisional application (FR’966) was paid on March 7, 2018, i.e. after the filing of the second divisional application at stake here – so that the filing would be admissible under the appellant’s interpretation of R. 612-34.

The court sided with the INPI on this interpretation issue.

First, they made reference to article L. 612-4:

The patent application can only relate to one invention or a plurality of inventions which are related so as to form a single general inventive concept. 

Any application not meeting the requirements of the previous paragraph must be divided within the statutory deadline; divisional applications benefit from the filing date and optionally priority date of the initial application

Thus, the court concluded that the “initial application” is the first one in the family – the one that defines the filing and priority dates for the entire family.

Second, the court stated that, in article R. 612-34, the term “patent” (cf. “until the payment of the fee for grant and printing of the patent”) refers to the same IP right as the “initial patent application” (cf. “may […] file divisional applications of its initial patent application“).

Ergo, the time limit condition applies to the payment of the fee for grant and printing in connection with the original application in the family.

In its submissions, Kubota made reference to articles L. 612-12-3 and L. 613-25 which prohibit extension of subject-matter in a divisional application, beyond the content of the “initial application as filed“. But the court was not convinced, noting that, precisely, this prohibition applies to a comparison with the original application in the family.

The court also remained insensitive to a comparison with other patent offices having a different practice: “the harmonization objective relates to the principle of the ability to divide a patent application, not the modalities of this division”.

All in all, the court’s position does not appear unreasonable. But is it compelling?

This lawn mower looks skeptical about the appeal decision.

Let’s take a step back. Article R. 612-34 does not strike me as being crystal clear. I suspect that this may be because its drafters did not have in mind the case of cascading divisional applications, i.e. divisional applications of divisional applications.

Furthermore, both main points of the court’s reasoning could potentially be challenged.

Starting with the second point in the court’s reasoning, how can we be certain that the term “patent” and the term “initial patent application” in R. 612-34 relate to one and the same thing? After all, they are not the same terms.

And then, going back to the first point, the court referred to L. 612-4 and concluded that the term “initial patent application” refers to the original application in the family.

But: 1, even if this is the case, the term “initial patent application” may or may not have been used perfectly consistently in the Code de la propriété intellectuelle; where is the evidence that it has exactly the same meaning in R. 612-34? And 2, “initial patent application” in L. 612-4 could also be interpreted as relating to the (immediate) parent application based on which the division is performed. It is true, that ultimately, the same filing date / priority date applies to the entire family, but in the case of cascading applications, it could simply be because the filing date of the “initial” application (meaning the parent application) is itself defined by reference to the filing date of its own “initial” application (meaning the grandparent application). A transitive definition, if you will.

Again, article R. 612-34 recites that “the applicant may, on its own initiative, file divisional applications of its initial patent application“. On the face of it, isn’t the “initial patent application” in this provision the one based on which the division is made, i.e. the immediate parent?

If so, we would come to the conclusion that:

  • Either it is only possible to file a divisional application based on the original application, i.e. cascading or second generation divisional applications are not allowed.
  • Or else, cascading applications are allowed, and the time limit in R. 612-34 applies to the previous application in the cascade, not to the source of the cascade.

In turn, if the above reasoning is correct, then this means that the INPI’s position that has just been validated by the court (cascading divisional applications are OK but the time limit applies to the original application) is contradictory.

In fact, on a practical standpoint, what is the point in allowing cascading divisional applications if you can only file a divisional application when the original application in the family is still pending? This is rather useless, and you may as well decide that only divisional applications stemming from the original application are possible.

As a final and important remark, the court acknowledged in passing that the INPI’s practice prior to 2011 was different, but added that this does not matter.

Well, does it not? I am quite curious about this. Do readers have any information to share about this change of practice and what caused it? Article R. 612-34 has been here and has not been modified since 1995.

Now that it is time to finish this post, I am left with the impression that even simple legal points are not necessarily straightforward.

Let’s see if there is a cassation appeal, and if so, what the court will make of this.


CASE REFERENCE: Cour d’appel de Paris, pôle 5 chambre 2, November 22, 2019, Kubota Corporation v. Directeur Genéral de l’INPI, RG No. 18/27433.

Outdated soon

Glad to be back on the blog, with a report on a decision which already has the flavor of a thing from the past. I am very grateful to Philippe Schmitt for providing this judgment, after commenting it on his blog.

Thales, the famous electronics company, filed a French patent application at the INPI (Institut National de la Propriété Industrielle) on December 17, 2010. It was published under No. FR 2969124. A decision of refusal of the application was issued on July 17, 2018. Thales appealed, which leads us to the judgment at stake.

Here is claim 1 of the application, as modified during examination proceedings:

A method for displaying the steps of a mission of an aircraft on a screen of a display device, the mission being a flight plan, wherein each step corresponds to a waypoint of the flight plan, characterized in that the different steps are displayed in a first graphical window comprising a time scale, or “timeline” (TL), the different steps being displayed opposite the schedule corresponding to their accomplishment, and the length of the “timeline” is longer than the length of the first graphical window, and the graphical window therefore displays only a part of the “timeline”, this part being imposed by the user of the display device.

The application was refused by the INPI as they deemed that:

  • The application merely relates to a presentation of information associated to a mathematical method, without any technical features.
  • The claimed subject-matter cannot be searched and thus compared with the state of the art.

More precisely, the INPI considered that the problem at stake in the application was to facilitate the reading and correlation of data relating to the steps of an aircraft mission, provided by different display windows. In the absence of any such facilitation, operators have to check themselves the consistency of the information provided by various windows. Thus, the INPI held, the problem at stake relates to the interpretation of the data by the operators, and not to a technology of data representation. In other terms, the problem at stake is intellectual and not technical.

Regarding the last feature of claim 1, per which “the length of the “timeline” is longer than the length of the first graphical window, and the graphical window therefore displays only a part of the “timeline”, this part being imposed by the user of the display device”, the INPI remarked that the description of the application does not specify by which technical means the user displays “a part of the timeline“. Therefore, this feature is not characterized on the technical standpoint and no technical effect deriving from human-machine interactions is disclosed in the application.

The Paris court of appeal set aside the refusal, on the following grounds.

First, the court referred to the INPI guidelines and also to the EPO guidelines, regarding the definition of a “presentation of information“. The court thus held that information that is presented is not patentable, but that the way information is presented may comprise patentable technical features if it is distinct from the information itself. In particular, a feature which credibly helps the user perform a technical task owing to a continuous or guided human-machine interaction process provides a technical effect.

Next, the court analyzed that the objective of the patent is to transmit information to a user, more specifically the pilot or copilot of an aircraft, so that he/she has a consistent and integrated representation of the mission, in order to make decisions based on a complete knowledge of the state of the aircraft and of its environment.

The court then turned to the first characterizing feature of the claim, and concluded that it is not a technical feature. Namely:

The first feature relates to a window comprising the “timeline”, which displays the different steps opposite the schedule corresponding to their accomplishment. […] Such a window, oriented with past at the bottom and future on top, vertically divided in its center by a timeline, comprises way times on its left and remarkable way points on its right, including mentions such as speed, altitude, beside the current position of the aircraft represented by a symbol “A”. It thus appears that this feature, although it is key to the patent applied for, only relates to the transmission of information to the pilot of the aircraft, both concerning the cognitive information content (way times and way points) and the manner it is presented (as a function of a timeline). There is no distinct technical feature and it is thus not patentable per se. 

However, the court’s take on the very last claimed feature was quite different:

On the other hand, the second feature recites that when the length of the timeline is longer than the length of the first graphical window, the user (pilot) may display only part of the timeline (imposed by him/her). This is a technical means distinct from the content of the information itself. It should be added that this means helps the pilot select the most relevant of said information and thus produces a technical effect […].

In order to conclude that this feature is nevertheless not patentable, the [INPI] asserts that it only mentions a result to be achieved, namely imposing the display of part of the timeline, without clearly setting out the technical means allowing such result to be achieved. However, during examination proceedings, the [INPI] does not have the power to rule on the insufficiency of disclosure of the patent, so that this reasoning is moot. [The INPI] also asserts that this insufficiency of disclosure does not allow a comparison with the state of the art and the preparation of a search report. However, nothing prevents a prior art search, for instance in the “WL” window displaying the list of way points as a table, [to check] if the user can, when the length of this list is greater than the length of the window, display only part of this list. 

Presentation of information can be technical after all.

In summary, the court held that the last feature of the claim is a technical feature, so that the claimed subject-matter is an invention (or rather, is not a non-invention, as patent law is somewhat Carrollian).

The absence of disclosure of precise technical means in the description of the application should not be taken into account, the court added, since insufficiency of disclosure is not a ground for refusal of a French patent application.

In fact, the current list of grounds of refusal of a French patent application is quite limited. For example, lack of inventive step is not one of these grounds, and this is why there is no discussion of inventive step whatsoever in the judgment. This is also why the decision will be outdated soon, as additional grounds of refusal (including lack of inventive step) will be taken into consideration in the near future – see my previous report here on the Pacte bill.

A case like this one is actually probably a good argument in favor of this bill. Indeed, it makes little sense for the court of appeal to set aside a refusal without having to discuss or consider inventive step at all – which of course should be an important point to look at, since lack of inventive step is a ground for nullity of a granted patent.

This case has also made me realize that insufficiency of disclosure has not been introduced as a new ground for refusal in the Pacte bill. Why that is is a conundrum. If the aim is to strengthen French national patents and beef up examination proceedings, why leave a ground for nullity out of the INPI’s purview?

As a final remark, I am, like the court of appeal, unconvinced by the alleged impossibility to perform a prior art search. This is a current and actual ground for refusal, but in my view it should be limited to extreme cases in which the claims are for instance so poorly drafted that they are not understandable. On the other hand, as a matter of policy I do not believe that this provision should apply to features which are alleged to be non-technical – which is always a debatable notion, as shown above.

Now, here is another interesting thing. There is no European patent application equivalent to the French application at stake. But the French application was sent out to the EPO for a prior art search, as is the case for all French applications which do not claim a foreign priority.

And the file wrapper shows that the EPO examiner refused to perform the search, and noted that the claims “relate to a an abstract and generic process of displaying data, independently from any technology. This subject-matter is excluded from patentability, like any abstract method of graphical representation as such, as it is equivalent to a mathematical method“.

Therefore, to some extent, the INPI’s refusal was really based on an EPO examiner’s position.

The feature found to be technical by the court was present in claim 2 of the original claim set. So perhaps the EPO examiner did not pay as much attention to it as he should have. Or perhaps the Paris court of appeal has a more generous view of technical features than the EPO, when it comes to graphical user interfaces. Or perhaps the court would have found the claims invalid based on another ground if all grounds were within its purview.

When the new examination proceedings come into force, it can be expected that the number of refusals will markedly increase, especially in the particular field of technology of graphical user interfaces. This could give the court of appeal the opportunity to further elaborate on its views on this topic.

And if it turns out in the end that its stance is less strict than the EPO’s, this could entail a dramatic shift in filing strategies.


CASE REFERENCE: Cour d’appel de Paris, pôle 5 chambre 1, May 21, 2019, Thales v. Directeur Général de l’INPI, RG No. 18/19669.

A packed Pacte

France has a funny bicameral system.

Both chambers of the parliament, the Assemblée nationale and the Sénat, get to debate on, amend and vote bills. But if they fail to agree on the same version of a bill, in the end the Assemblée nationale has the last word.

And so it is with the so-called “Loi Pacte“, first discussed on this blog post. There was some suspense as to what the bill would finally contain, as it bounced back and forth, being amended and dis-amended from one chamber to the other. But now the suspense has come to an end as the bill has been finally adopted and will become the law of the land.

Well, unless there is a last minute surprise, as the constitutionality of the bill will likely be challenged in front of the Conseil constitutionnel (our constitutional supreme court) by disgruntled members of parliament.

The final text is here and it is 408 pages long (yes, that is some packed Pacte). It has many different aspects, including some controversial ones – like the privatization of ADP (the company that runs Paris’ airports). It also contains some provisions on IP, including just a few ones on patent law – but they are very important provisions indeed.

Basically, the report that I previously made on the draft still stands, although the articles have been renumbered:

  • The maximum duration of utility certificates will be brought from 6 years to 10 years (article 118).
  • It will be possible to convert a utility certificate application into a patent application within a deadline which still needs to be determined, whereas only the opposite is possible as of today (article 118).
  • The government is authorized to rule by way of an ordonnance in order to set up a procedure for third parties to oppose a granted patent (article 121).
  • The INPI (French patent office) will be able to refuse a patent application if its subject-matter is not an invention or is excluded from patentability, in contrast with the current formulation, per which its subject-matter is “manifestly” not an invention or is “manifestly” excluded from patentability (article 122).
  • The INPI will be able to refuse a patent application if its subject-matter is not novel or not inventive, in contrast with the current formulation, per which an application may be refused if it was not modified despite a “manifest” lack of novelty (article 122).
  • Infringement actions will be time-barred five years after the day the right owner knew or should have known the last fact allowing them to act, as opposed to the current formulation, which is five years “from the facts” (article 124).
  • The statute of limitations will no longer apply to patent nullity actions (article 124).

So, there you have it, I don’t know if it is spring or winter, but a new season is definitely coming.

In the year 2525 – if patents can survive.

So what next? Well, first we will have to carefully look at transitional provisions.

In this respect, I have noted the following:

  • The new provisions on utility certificates shall enter into force when the implementing decree is published, or one year from the publication of the law at the latest.
  • The timeline for the introduction of the opposition proceedings is still unclear, as it will depend on the regulations (ordonnance) that the government will issue.
  • Provisions extending the scope of examination of patent applications by the INPI shall enter into force one year from the publication of the law.
  • The new provision on the statute of limitations for nullity actions will immediately enter into force – but will have no effect on decisions that have become res judicata. It remains to be seen how this will be interpreted in practice.

The bottom line is that, regarding the biggest changes for patent applicants, patent attorneys and the patent office, we have some time to get prepared – but we all know how that usually flies.

The nitty-gritty of the new system is still unclear and will require our full attention.

Moreover, another question mark is how the INPI will adapt to this upheaval.

Based on a report on a meeting between the INPI management and representatives of the patent profession a few weeks ago, the following seems to be contemplated at present:

  • The projected date of entry into force of the patent opposition proceedings is January 1, 2020 (this is quite ambitious).
  • The projected start of the examination of inventive step is mid-2021 (this is because the new law will only apply to newly filed applications, I presume).
  • In terms of HR efforts, 15 patent examiners currently working on a backlog of national search reports will be redeployed to deal with opposition cases, and 16 new patent examiners will be hired to deal in particular with the increased workload related to the examination proceedings.

We also learn from this report that the new French “provisional patent application“, that we have heard of a number of times, is not dead. It should be created soon by way of a government decree.

I am curious to know what such a provisional application will look like. So far, patent professionals have been extremely skeptical about this – to put it mildly.

According to one apocryphal anecdote, President Macron was told by a French start-upper a few years ago that U.S. law is much more favorable to innovators than French law, because they have provisional applications in the U.S.

As a reminder, filing a French patent application without claims and without paying any taxes gives you a filing date, which is all you need to later claim priority. So, if there is any truth to this anecdote, it probably means that our President never met a French patent attorney – or at least that such a meeting did not leave as strong an impression as the ones he had with start-up folks. Which, let’s face it, is quite understandable.

A travel back in time

Regular readers of this blog are probably aware that Lionel Vial is a frequent contributor.

I am grateful for his thorough reporting on pharma / biotech case law. Today, he once again keeps us apprised of the latest SPC tidbit. As he even provided the illustration, I really have nothing to add but say thanks!

While we are all waiting for the decision of the CJEU in the Santen case (C-673/18) to finally know if, in application of the Neurim (C-130/11) case law, a patented novel medical use in humans of a product having already been authorized for a previous different medical use in humans deserves a supplementary protection certificate (SPC), the decision discussed today will take us back to the pre-Neurim era, a time of uncertainty as we will see.

At that time, the prevailing case law regarding further medical use consisted in Pharmacia Italia SpA (C-31/03) rendered on October 19, 2004, and Yissum (C-202/05) rendered on April 17, 2007.

According to the judgment in Pharmacia Italia SpA:

The grant of a supplementary protection certificate in a Member State of the Community on the basis of a medicinal product for human use authorised in that Member State is precluded by an authorisation to place the product on the market as a veterinary medicinal product granted in another Member State of the Community before the date specified in Article 19(1) of Council Regulation No 1768/92 of 18 June 1992 concerning the creation of a supplementary protection certificate for medicinal products.

On the other hand, the order in Yissum reads:

Article 1(b) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 1768/92 of 18 June 1992 concerning the creation of a supplementary protection certificate for medicinal products […] is to be interpreted as meaning that in a case where a basic patent protects a second medical use of an active ingredient, that use does not form an integral part of the definition of the product.

The DeLorean remains the best way to travel in time with style.

The Regents of the University of Colorado (hereafter the University) was granted European patent No. 1658858 on November 18, 2009 for the use of a botulinum toxin, in particular botulinum toxin type A, in the preparation of a pharmaceutical composition for treating a recalcitrant voiding dysfunction, in particular urinary incontinence.

A corresponding marketing authorization was then granted on August 22, 2011.

The University had six month (that is until February 22, 2012) to file an SPC application. However, since botulinum toxin type A had benefited of previous marketing authorizations and in view of the then prevailing case law, the University considered it impossible to have an SPC granted and therefore no SPC application was filed.

Then the Neurim judgment was rendered on July 19, 2012. It notably provides that:

Articles 3 and 4 of Regulation (EC) No 469/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 concerning the supplementary protection certificate for medicinal products must be interpreted as meaning that, in a case such as that in the main proceedings, the mere existence of an earlier marketing authorisation obtained for a veterinary medicinal product does not preclude the grant of a supplementary protection certificate for a different application of the same product for which a marketing authorisation has been granted, provided that the application is within the limits of the protection conferred by the basic patent relied upon for the purposes of the application for the supplementary protection certificate.

Neurim has often been considered as a complete reversal of the previous case law.

Besides, for many commentators, it opened the door to SPCs for novel medical uses in humans of products having already been authorized for a previous different medical use in humans.

The University therefore filed an SPC application on September 19, 2012, i.e. within 2 months of the publication of the Neurim judgment, but about 7 months after the end of the deadline for doing so.

The University sought to benefit from the provisions of Article L. 612-16 of the Code de la propriété intellectuelle, according to which:

Where an applicant has not complied with a time limit as regards the Institut National de la Propriété Industrielle, it may submit an appeal for reinstatement of it rights if it is able to give a legitimate reason and if the direct consequence of the hindrance has been refusal of its patent application or of a request or the loss of any other right or means of appeal.

The appeal must be submitted to the Director of the Institut National de la Propriété Industrielle within two months of the cessation of the hindrance. The act that has not been carried out must be accomplished within that period. The appeal shall only be admissible within a period of one year from expiry of the time limit not complied with. […]

However, the INPI (French patent office) was not convinced and rejected the appeal for reinstatement on June 30, 2015.

The University and Allergan (to whom the SPC application and the basic patent had then been assigned) appealed the decision of the Director of the INPI before the Paris Cour d’appel on September 18, 2015.

In a first decision dated September 16, 2016 the Cour d’appel confirmed the decision of the INPI. However, the decision was invalidated by the Cour de cassation, the French Supreme court, on April 5, 2018, for procedural reasons, as the Cour d’appel had neglected notifying observations made by the INPI to the University and Allergan.

The case then came back in front of the Paris Cour d’appel which, albeit with different judges, again confirmed the decision of the INPI on February 12, 2019 in the following terms:

However, according to the terms of article L. 612-16 of the intellectual property code, the legitimate reason must be understood as a “hindrance”;

Even considering that the case law of the CJEU, before the Neurim judgement, did not allow the University to expect obtaining an SPC and could therefore discourage it to file an SPC application, the director of the INPI rightly observes that this situation does not characterize a hindrance according to the previously cited provision, given that the case law, be it that of the Court of justice, evolves, that even with the Pharmacia Italia and Yissum case law other operators have indeed filed SPC applications in relation to further medical uses, one of which having given rise to the Neurim judgment, and that the lack of filing of an SPC application by the University was the result of its free appreciation of the latter and not of an objective impossibility, independent of its will.

In any case, pursuant to article 7 of regulation No. 469/2009 concerning the supplementary protection certificate for medicinal products, the University had a six-month period expiring on February 22, 2012 to file its SPC application; the reference for preliminary ruling to the Court of justice of the European Union was received at the Court on March 16, 2011 and published in the OJEU on June 18, 2011; under these conditions, as is rightly observed by the director of the INPI, the University had to consider a possible reversal of the case law of the Court of justice;

As such, the decision of the director of the INPI is exempt from criticism in having retained that the lack of respect of the deadline imparted to the University for filing its SPC application was not due to a hindrance for which it would benefit from a legitimate reason, but to its will not to proceed with a filing that it did not consider appropriate and this in spite of the reference for a preliminary ruling submitted to the Court of justice duly published on June 18, 2011.

Perhaps, this case is an illustration that too much knowledge is sometimes dangerous, and that we, as counsels, should always be careful when giving opinions on the likely outcome of a filing on the basis of our knowledge of established case law, bearing in mind that there is always a possibility, even a remote one, that a case law can be overturned.

In any case, the University and Allergan should refrain from nourishing regrets on their missed filing at least until the result of the Santen referral (C-673/18) is known, as this latter case precisely arises from a decision of rejection of an SPC application by the INPI in relation to a further medical use.

Well, the way I see it, getting SPC law 100% right is a little bit like having to hit a wire with a connecting hook at precisely eighty-eight miles per hour the instant a lightning strikes a tower. Everything will be fine.


CASE REFERENCE: Cour d’appel de Paris, pôle 5 chambre 1, February 12, 2019, The Regents of the University of Colorado & Allergan Inc. v. Directeur de l’Institut National de la Propriété Industrielle, RG No. 18/14291.