Free infringement

Infringement proceedings are a thing of many possible metaphors, and one of them may be an assault course. Invalidity defenses, non-infringement arguments, burden of proof issues, procedural traps are some of the hurdles that a plaintiff has to go over along the way.

So, after climbing up so many walls, nets and ropes, it is really too bad when the plaintiff falls into a muddy pit just before the finish line. In the case at hand, the muddy pit was the assessment of damages.

Pick your track to a judicial win.

On March 20, 2014, the Paris Tribunal de grande instance (TGI) held that the two companies Carrera and Texas de France had committed acts of infringement of European patent EP 1067822 directed to a heating element for a heating or cooking apparatus, owned by Muller & Cie.

The court pronounced a permanent injunction against the defendants and ordered that they should provide accounting information regarding the infringing devices in order to make it possible to compute damages.

This judgment was confirmed by the Paris Cour d’appel on September 6, 2016. In the meantime, in view of the accounting information filed by the defendants, the TGI issued a second judgment dated January 14, 2016, in which Carrera and Texas de France were condemned to pay Muller damages of respectively 327,733 euros and 280,130 euros for Muller’s commercial prejudice, plus 100,000 euros for its moral prejudice.

The defendants appealed, which leads us to today’s judgment, issued on December 9, 2016.

In short, the appeal judges set aside the decision of January 14, 2016 and set the total amount of damages to… zero euro. How is this even possible, since acts of infringement were indeed committed?

The answer is that the legal basis for Muller’s computation of damages was held to be incorrect, and no alternative, legally correct computation seems to have been proposed by the plaintiff.

The method for the computation of damages is set in article L. 615-7 Code de la propriété intellectuelle:

In order to set damages, the court separately takes into account:

1° Negative economic consequences of the infringement, including lost profits and losses suffered by the harmed party;

2° Moral prejudice inflicted to said party;

3° And profits made by the infringer, including savings on intellectual, material and promotional investments made owing to the infringement.

However, the court may, alternatively and upon request of the harmed party, grant a lump sum in terms of damages. This lump sum is higher than the amount of royalties or rights which would have been due if the infringer had asked for the authorization to use the right that it infringed. This sum does not exclude the further indemnification of the moral prejudice of the harmed party.  

The current wording of the article derives from the implementation of the enforcement directive 2004/48/EC, with a later modification in 2014. And it is not really crystal clear.

Computation of damages based on the “negative economic consequences” of the infringement is a conventional and well-delineated exercise.

On the other hand, how “profits made by the infringer” are to be “taken into account” by the court is not self-evident. It is also not so clear whether the plaintiff has full discretion to rely on the alternative lump sum calculation, or whether, in some circumstances, it is mandatory to rely on one assessment method or the other.

If we focus first on the issue of how infringer’s profits are to be “taken into account“, one way to interpret this provision would be to consider that the infringer’s profits may be awarded to the claimant as an alternative to loss profits damages. Another way would be to consider that the infringer’s profits are merely a modulating factor in the assessment of loss profits.

In the present case, Muller put forward a radical theory – successfully so in first instance, i.e. that the entire infringer’s profits should be awarded to the patent proprietor. However, this method was fully discarded at the appeal stage.

The Cour d’appel noted that Muller did not personally exploit the patent. The patent was exploited through six licensed subsidiaries, which tried to intervene in the infringement proceedings. However, the respective license agreements were not registered with the French patent register, so that they were not enforceable against third parties. Accordingly, the claims brought by the six licensees were previously held inadmissible in the initial 2014 judgment – and the unregistered licensees did not appeal.

In this particular context, the Cour d’appel deemed that the sole proper methodology for assessing damages was the so-called indemnifying royalty provided in the last paragraph of article L.615-7:

[Muller] does not claim the payment of the indemnifying royalty which was however rightly mentioned by the appellant, but this mode of compensation should be applied in this case. This royalty indeed corresponds to the percentage of the turnover that Muller could have claimed from the two companies sued for infringement, if the authorization to exploit the patent that it owns had been requested, with an additional penalty to take into account the existence of the wrongful acts committed against it. 

But again, Muller did specifically not claim an indemnifying royalty. Muller argued that the words “upon request of the harmed party” in article L. 615-7 meant that this mode of calculation was not mandatory. The court concurred and stated that it “could not validly impose such a mode of compensation of its economical prejudice” on Muller. But this turned out to be a self-inflicted wound, as the sole mode of compensation put forward by Muller was not acceptable according to the court, for the two following reasons:

  • first, Muller did not personally suffer any lost profits;
  • second, the infringer’s profits may not be claimed by the plaintiff in the absence of lost profits.

As to the first reason, Muller argued that, although it had not directly suffered lost profits, there were lost profits for the overall Muller group. The court replied that Muller could not possibly claim lost profits suffered by other companies, namely the six licensees, which are distinct legal entities (in fact, it seems that it was not even properly demonstrated that they were part of the same group as Muller). The licensees’ claims were held inadmissible by the TGI, and they did not appeal. Thus, only Muller’s personal lost profits could possibly be compensated.

Yet, no lost royalties were claimed by Muller. On the one hand, the six licenses were apparently royalty-less, so that Muller did not personally lose money due to the licensees’ possible lost sales. On the other hand, Muller could have relied on a depreciation of the invention’s value due to the infringement, but did not do so. Here, the court cruelly noted: “again, it is not the court’s task to compensate an item of prejudice in the absence of a claim from the owner of the right in this respect“.

Then comes the second point on the infringer’s profits. Says the court:

In addition, it is true that the law of October 29, 2007, transposing the 2004/48 directive, provides that the judge should take into account the “profits made by the infringer”. But it did not introduce a possibility to confiscate them into the statute. Said taking into account is limited to the part which may remain, once the losses related to the exploitation have been assessed, in order to achieve a full compensation of the prejudice. 

In other words, according to this court, the infringer’s profits can only be taken into account in the context of the assessment of a commercial prejudice. The confiscation of the infringer’s profits is not an alternative option which would be available to the plaintiff instead of claiming the compensation of a commercial prejudice.

Consequently, Muller’s claim for damages was simply rejected. The court noted in passing that the permanent injunction, which remains in place, is a proper sanction in this case anyway.

The last nail in the coffin was the rejection of Muller’s claim based on the moral prejudice which was said to be insufficiently substantiated.

All in all, this is a tough decision for the patentee, although we can have a feeling that the court was irritated by its behavior. For instance, there is a remark that the patentee obtained evidence of the infringement as soon as July 2009 owing to a bailiff’s report but waited until May 2011 to file its complaint.

It remains to be seen whether the Cour de cassation will have to rule on the Cour d’appel’s interpretation of the legal provision on the apportionment of the infringer’s profits.

In the meantime, one take-away message can be that the best practice for a patent proprietor is certainly to claim an indemnifying royalty, if only as an auxiliary request. Indeed, this should always be a possible option. Better safe than sorry.


CASE REFERENCE: Cour d’appel de Paris, pôle 5 chambre 2, December 9, 2016, SARL Carrera & SAS Texas de France v. SA Muller et Cie, RG No. 16/02891.

Damage control

Sometimes, a case is not over even after it is lost. This is especially true when a defendant is found guilty of patent infringement but the amount of damages is not yet determined in the infringement ruling. It is then still time to continue fighting for damage control. And this can pay off, like in the present case, where the total damages award amounted to approximately 7% of what the plaintiffs requested. That is, if my math is correct because the ruling contains so many figures that it is quite easy to lose track.

An example of not-too-bad damage control.
An example of not-too-bad damage control.

The story started a while ago, more precisely in June 2005, when Hutchinson, owner of European patent No. EP 0691481 (on a connecting rod for vehicles), together with its subsidiary and licensee Paulstra, sued two companies, CF Gomma Barre Thomas and Paul Robert Industrie, for infringement of the patent. CF Gomma Barre Thomas entered insolvency proceedings later in the same year, so that the infringement proceedings continued against the court-appointed receiver. In 2007, after another infringement seizure, a third company was added as a defendant, namely Société des Polymères Barre Thomas (later renamed as Cooper-Standard France).

In June 2009, the Paris Tribunal de grande instance (TGI) declared the patent valid but rejected all infringement claims. Hutchinson and Paulstra appealed.

In October 2011, the Cour d’appel confirmed that the patent was valid but set aside the first instance judgment as far as infringement is concerned: claims 1, 2, 4 and 5 of the patent were held to be infringed. The appeal ruling appointed an expert for determining the amount of damages.

A cassation appeal was lodged, and the supreme court judges partly canceled the 2011 judgment, because the finding of infringement of dependent claims 2, 4 and 5 was not sufficiently reasoned. However, this partial cancellation left intact the main findings of the 2011 judgment – in terms of validity of the patent and infringement of the main claim.

This leads us to the second ruling by the Paris Cour d’appel in 2016, after the expertise, on the assessment of damages.

Not exactly a fun read – unless you are an accountant, that is. But an important one, as this is the point at which the lawsuit finally has an actual impact on the various companies’ finances.

The guidelines for the assessment of damages are set forth in article L. 615-7 of the Code de la propriété intellectuelle:

In order to assess damages, the court shall separately take into account: 

1. Negative economic consequences of infringement, including lost profits and actual losses incurred by the harmed party. 

2. Moral prejudice. 

3. Profits made by the infringer, including intellectual, material and marketing investment savings deriving from the infringement. 

However, the court can alternatively, upon request of the harmed party, award a lump sum as damages. This lump sum is greater than the amount of royalties which would have been due if the infringer had asked for the permission to use the right that it infringed. This lump sum can be in addition to the indemnification of the moral prejudice.

A first issue raised by the defendants was whether the above (current) provision was applicable or not, given that it was modified in 2014. In particular the notion of “intellectual, material and marketing investment savings deriving from the infringement” was not recited in the earlier version of the law.

The court replied that the current provision is indeed applicable since the 2014 modification in fact did not change anything and did not add a new damages count; it is simply more explicit than the previous one.

A second issue was the definition of the perimeter of the infringing goods. Four models of connecting rods were mentioned in the infringement seizure reports of 2005 and 2007. These models were clearly to be taken into account in the assessment of damages. But the plaintiffs contended that six further models were also infringing and should also be taken into account.

The court disagreed. Indeed, the 2011 appeal judgment held that the first four models were infringing. Whether the six other models are also infringing or not was not decided upon. The 2011 ruling also contained an order not to make, market, and the like, any connecting rods identical or similar to the ones found to be infringing. However, this could not be seen as a basis for including the additional six models in the assessment:

This injunction, which guarantees that the monopoly right is restored to its state before the infringement, concerns the future and makes it possible if necessary to start further legal proceedings against an infringer who is then aware of the infringement. 

I have of course no idea whether the six additional models of connecting rods were similar or identical to the first four ones. But I think it is really a pity that the court did not find a way to rule on the additional infringement claim in this ruling (be it to hold that the new models infringe, do not infringe, or that there is not enough evidence of infringement). Telling the plaintiffs that they can start a new action does not seem satisfactory on the standpoint of efficiency, especially in view of the overall duration of the present proceedings.

The rest of the decision is concerned with the actual computation of damages, plaintiff by plaintiff, defendant by defendant, and period of time by period of time.

For the most part, the expert’s report was approved by the court.

By way of example, the plaintiffs contended that some accessories, such as fixation means, should also be included in the calculation, in view of the well-known doctrine of the “tout commercial” (which could be translated as the doctrine of the commercial package). The court rejected the contention, because there was no evidence that the accessories were sold as a consequence of the sale of the infringing connecting rods.

Paulstra claimed that it has suffered lost profits because they would have been able to make and sell all the connecting rods according to the invention marketed by the defendants. This point was accepted by the expert and the court.

However, the margin to be applied to the lost sales in order to compute loss profits was hotly debated.

Paulstra successively announced three different margins: 3%, 5.6% and finally 9.7%. They said the first two figures were erroneous: the first one concerned another equipment, and the second one concerned all connecting rods in general and not specifically those protected by the patent.

The court was (understandably) irritated by this flip-flopping and was not convinced that the initial figure was erroneous:

[The defendants] rightly stigmatize the behavior of Hutchinson and Paulstra, by emphasizing the contradictions in their successive statements, their inconsistency, and their lack of credibility, stating that this is due to their decision to prevent any control over Paulstra’s claims […]. The error alleged by Paulstra when the first rate of 3% was mentioned is indeed not credible, in view of the time that they took before replying to the expert, and of the importance of its “connecting rods” business. They necessarily knew what it was worth […].

Furthermore, the final figure of 9.7% was only supported by a statement by the company’s accounting director; and by a late-filed communication from an external auditor. The former was criticized by the expert as being a non-certified statement. The latter was disregarded by the court as it was too vague and imprecise, and not explicit enough.

As a result, the court applied a margin rate of 3% to Paulstra’s lost sales, also noting in passing that it is “the rate generally used in this type of product in the automobile industry“.

The moral prejudice suffered by the licensee Paulstra was calculated by the expert to be 125,000 euros. But the judges reduced this amount to zero. They held that there was no evidence that the defendants’ actions had harmed Paulstra’s reputation, as was alleged.

Turning to the patentee, Hutchinson first claimed lost profits due to Paulstra’s lost sales, because the patent was licensed to the subsidiary. Here, again, the court refused to take such lost profits into account:

It cannot be denied that a patent proprietor that does not exploit the invention but grants a license for its exploitation has the right to be awarded the profits it did not make because of the infringement. But it has to show that the alleged lost profits are real. 

In this respect, even if it is demonstrated that Hutchinson and its subsidiary Paulstra were bound by a lease management agreement, Hutchinson does not provide any evidence as to the profits earned owing to the license. […]

[…] [Hutchinson] relied on trade secret as the reason why no information was provided in this respect. But, during the expertise proceedings, they stated: “[…] these damages should no be calculated based on the contractual royalty that Paulstra would pay to Hutchinson. Indeed, Paulstra is only a subsidiary of Hutchinson, and it is not conventional, at least in terms of patentee-licensee relationships, to have such contractual royalty be paid between companies of a same group” […]. 

Since the very existence of the royalty was not demonstrated, the corresponding claim cannot succeed. 

Again, the claimants’ ambiguous statements certainly played against them. Half-admitting that there was no license royalties between Hutchinson and Paulstra while relying on trade secret not to say more was not a successful strategy for convincing the court that there were indeed lost profits to be recovered. Would the outcome have been different if Hutchinson had claimed the lump sum provided for in the last paragraph of article L. 615-7, which cannot be less than the royalties the infringer would have paid? I tend to think so.

Hutchinson was nevertheless awarded 60,000 euros (as estimated by the expert) in terms of moral prejudice. It is indeed generally accepted that patent infringement necessarily causes moral prejudice to the patent proprietor because the invention is depreciated.

On the other hand, Hutchinson lost again when they claimed the profits due to the infringers’ investment savings. They estimated such profits to be equal to 5% of the defendants’ connecting rod turnover. But the court held that the profits made by the defendants had already been taken into account in Paulstra’s damages; and that the claimed percentage, allegedly based on Hutchinson’s own spending, was not credibly substantiated, since it seemed to include other activities than those related to the patented invention.

In summary the total damages award for Hutchinson and Paulstra is 652,003 euros. Was the so far 11-year long litigation worth it? Of course the damages award is only part of the answer, as the claimants did get a permanent injunction which after all is the actual weapon of mass destruction in a patent war.

Anyway, the case strikingly illustrates that damages assessment is an endeavor of its own, sometimes underestimated by litigants. Just like for the assessment of validity and infringement, the court wants to see convincing evidence of whatever is asserted by the parties and will not satisfy itself with unsupported statements, let alone ambiguous ones.


CASE REFERENCE: Cour d’appel de Paris, Pôle 5, chambre 2, February 12, 2016, Hutchinson & Paulstra v. CF Gomma Barre Thomas et al., RG No. 09/13793.

Cook’in cooked

There is nothing like home-made food. Unfortunately, it seems like kitchens are never roomy enough to accommodate all those nice and fancy appliances for making soups, ice creams, bread, fondue and all that jazz. But as far as courtrooms go, some extra space can always be found for new kitchen appliance lawsuits.

In two previous posts, I discussed a case brought by Vorwerk & Co. Interholding GmbH against various companies responsible for the marketing of food processors of the MyCook brand in France. This case was indeed a good example of how patent infringement damages can be computed in our country.

It turns out that another case was also brought in parallel by the same company, based on the same patent, against other defendants (Guy Demarle Grand Public SAS et al.) responsible for the marketing of another food processor branded as Cook’in. Cook’in was held by the Paris Tribunal de Grande Instance (TGI) as infringing Vorwerk’s patent, just like MyCook – although readers may recall that the appeal judgment on the merits in the MyCook case was set aside by the Cour de Cassation for procedural reasons, so that the Cour d’appel will have to reconsider the issue afresh.

The reasoning adopted by the TGI on the question of infringement in the Cook’in case is very similar to that previously adopted by the TGI and the Cour d’appel in the MyCook case. So, in a way, the recent Cook’in TGI decision is not really surprising; but the decision is a very interesting example of how the doctrine of equivalence is applied in France.

According to well-established case law, two technical means are deemed equivalent if they are of a different form, but perform a same function for a similar result. An additional condition is that the function in question must be protectable.

In this case, claim 1 of the patent reads as follows:

Kitchen machine with a stirrer vessel and a drive for an agitator in the stirrer vessel, wherein the stirrer vessel in its lower region can be heated up, wherein the stirrer vessel is covered by an inserted lid, characterised in that on the inserted lid is arranged a top piece which has a perforated bottom for preparation by steaming of foods, wherein the perforations are formed in a cooking material support of the bottom of the top piece and condensate or moisture formed is conducted back into the stirrer vessel.

This claim was not literally infringed by the Cook’in apparatus for the following reason, according to the court:

The Cook’in machine of the defendants differs from the kitchen machine of the patent in that it does not comprise a lid between the stirrer vessel and the perforated element for steam cooking. This latter element comprises a flange in its lower part on which a seal is arranged, which makes it possible to directly attach it on the stirrer vessel.

The court then made a comparison between how the Cook’in apparatus operates and how the patented machine operates and, applying the traditional test, came to the conclusion that the different technical means that are used did in fact have the same function for a similar result:

[…] Even though the Cook’in machine does not have the insertable lid as taught by claim 1 […], the embossed annular part of the vapor bowl associated with the seal disposed on the periphery provides a means of a [different] form which has the same function, namely ensuring that the cap is above the stirrer vessel, for the same result, i.e. making vapors rise from the stirrer vessel to the upper part of the cap through the dedicated openings and reintroducing the condensates into the stirrer vessel. 

Various arguments were put forward by the defendants in order to show that the Cook’in apparatus did not operate in the same way as the claimed invention, but those were not deemed persuasive by the court.

The defendants also argued that the “inserted lid” feature in claim 1 was an essential feature of the invention which necessarily had to be reproduced in order for the patent to be infringed.

The interesting point about this argument is that this feature of the “inserted lid” was not present in claim 1 as filed and was added during prosecution. So, can the doctrine of equivalence be used at all in this situation? Yes, said the court. The fact that a feature was added during prosecution does not preclude a finding of infringement by equivalence on this very feature:

Vorwerk modified its claim by adding a lid, and the EPO examiner considered that the arrangement of the steam cooking container over the lid was a novel and inventive arrangement. 

Nevertheless, such novelty and inventiveness were acknowledged relative to a prior art where the pierced basket for steam cooking was positioned below the lid. 

Therefore, what was considered as novel and inventive was not so much the presence of the lid, but rather the fact that the steam cooking part was positioned above the stirrer and heating vessel. 

Thus, the scope of claim 1 does not prevent a possible infringement despite the absence of the intermediate lid, if it is established that the means of the Cook’in machine have the same functions for the same result as those of the patent. 

The analysis made by the court here relates to the second part of the equivalence test set forth above, i.e. whether the function of the equivalent means was “protectable“. In the present case, it seems that the function was protectable because the general idea of having a steam cooking recipient arranged above a stirrer vessel was a novel and inventive concept.

There are some devices in which the presence of a lid is absolutly essential.
There are some devices in which the presence of a lid is absolutly essential.

The bottom line of the court’s approach (which is indeed the traditional approach in France) is therefore to assess what the contribution of the invention to the art really is about. A third party’s product implementing the same inventive concept in a different manner will be held infringing, irrespective of the exact claim wording selected by the drafter.

Another interesting point to note about this decision is the computation of damages. Contrary to the parallel Vorwerk v. Taurus litigation, the court (in a different composition) did not appoint an expert but directly proceeded with the assessment of damages. The result of this assessment was similar but not exactly identical to the one made in Vorwerk v. Taurus.

The main point which was discussed was, again, the rate of the indemnifying royalty to be applied. The court was apparently unconvinced by the submissions of either party in this respect and therefore they preferred to rely on the expert’s report from the other case. Although the defendants were different and the infringing device was different, the rationale for determining the proper rate could indeed be applied in a similar manner.

The court noted that three options for the indemnifying royalty rate were offered by the expert, namely 1.5%, 3% and 4.5%. The court explicitly approved the methodology used by the expert, and then came up with its own figure without any clear justification:

In view of the above, in view of the profits made by the defendants, of the advantageous economic situation of [the defendants] due to the marketing of the patented invention without a license, the court can assess the harm suffered without granting the request for additional information, and the indemnifying royalty rate should be fixed to 4%.  

This figure of 4% does not correspond to any of the three options proposed by the expert in Vorwerk v. Taurus, although it is indeed within the expert’s range. But, more importantly, this is not the same figure as the one selected by the court in Vorwerk v. Taurus where a rate of 3% was ultimately chosen by the court! (Again, the composition of the court was different.) Unfortunately, there is no explanation as to why the Cook’in infringement is worth one third more than the MyCook infringement.

At the very least, this inconsistency should be a reminder that courts have a fairly wide discretionary power when it comes to determining the quantum of damages.


CASE REFERENCE: Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, 3ème chambre, 4ème section, July 2, 2015, Vorwerk & Co. Interholding GmbH v. SAS Guy Demarle Public et al., RG No. 12/11488.

 

Quel dommage – part 2

In this second post on damages assessment in the Vorwerk v. Taurus case, I will focus on the computation of the royalty rate used for the assessment of damages (the first part of the story is here).

According to established case law, the rate used for assessing damages needs to be based on a reasonable royalty rate that the parties would have agreed on, had they negotiated a license agreement, but then a multiplying factor needs to be applied to the basic royalty rate. This is often termed an indemnifying royalty.

Some believe that, according to a fundamental principle of civil law, damages cannot have a punitive nature as they are meant to repair a harm suffered by a victim (“all the harm, but not more than the harm”). Thus, an indemnifying royalty simply reflects the fact that a defendant found guilty of infringement would not be in a normal bargaining position and would be put at a disadvantage at the negotiation table.

Others are of the opinion that an indemnifying royalty is necessarily punitive in nature. This line of thought in fact seems to be consistent with what the court itself suggests in the Vorwerk damages decision:

[…] One should take into account the detrimental situation that the patent proprietor is in, since they have to put up with an exploitation of the invention that they have not decided. It would thus be unfair to simply apply a royalty rate equivalent to the one that they would have agreed on if they had negotiated a license agreement.

In the case at hand, the court was confronted with three different calculations of a royalty rate.

The first calculation was the expert’s: the defendants’ operating margin before taxes is 9.6%. A normal royalty rate should thus be 25% of this figure, so approximately 2.5%. However, this rate should further be cut in half and then rounded up to 1.5%, taking into account the fact that the importance of the patent was not paramount for marketing the food processors at stake. Then, three possible multiplying factors were offered by the expert to the court, namely 1 (which is not much of a multiplying factor), 2 or 3.

The second calculation was the plaintiff’s: the main difference between this calculation and the expert’s is that the plaintiff requested that the rate be calculated based on the defendants’ contribution margin, which was assessed to be significantly higher than the operating margin before taxes, at 22%. According to the plaintiff, some fixed costs were erroneously deduced by the expert from the margin, since the defendants would have supported these fixed costs anyway.

Then, the plaintiff suggested a royalty rate of 25 to 33% of the above margin, to which a true multiplying factor should be applied. The plaintiff disagreed with the expert’s finding regarding the lesser importance of the patent for the food processors at stake. But on the other hand, they agreed that those food processors in which the infringing steam-cooking cover was only optional (namely the Mycook Pro series) should be subjected to a lower overall rate than food processors in which the infringing steam-cooking cover was mandatory (the Mycook series).

Last (and least, in terms of figures), the defendants’ calculation was based on the proposition that the royalty rate should not be based on the overall turnover of the complete food processors, but rather on the turnover attributable to the steam-cooking cover. The price of the cover represents approximately 8% of the overall price. As far as the royalty rate itself is concerned, Taurus sided with the expert’s proposition of 2.5% to be cut in half – so, 1.25% without any rounding up. Taurus objected to any multiplying factor, by relying on the principle recalled above that there cannot be punitive damages under French law, and by adding that Vorwerk did not suffer from any negative consequence in the absence of evidence of any direct or indirect exploitation of the patent.

A calculator of royalty rates
A calculator of royalty rates

So, in summary, the three royalty rates offered to the court were:

  • 13% for the Mycook processors and 6.5% for the Mycook Pro processors (patentee);
  • 1.5, 3 or 4.5% for all processors, depending on the indemnifying multiplying factor (expert); and
  • 0.1% for all processors, if my math is correct: 1.25 % times 8 % (defendant).

The court selected the middle option, namely the expert’s. And among the three possibilities offered by the expert, they chose again the middle one, namely the 3% rate.

In particular, the court agreed with the selection of the operating margin, and with the proposition that 25% of this margin should represent a valid starting point for the royalty rate. Said the court, this coefficient of 25%

represents an allocation key which is commonly accepted in terms of patent licensing. 

It is indeed common thinking in patent licensing that approximately one fourth to one third of the profit made by the licensee owing to the invention should be paid back to the licensor, while the licensee should keep the rest of the profit. It is rather comforting that the court adopted this real-world pragmatic approach.

The court also agreed with the reduction of the rate suggested by the expert:

[…] In the marketing of the food processors at stake, the part taken by the exploitation of the patent itself needs to be put into perspective and reduced since other intangible assets may have contributed to the sales of these products.

Again, this looks like a sound approach. Traditional French case law on computation of damages was mainly established in situations wherein one invention equals one patent equals one product. But this probably no longer correctly reflects the current state of affairs, IP-wise. Even though food processors are not smartphones which incorporate technologies protected by thousands of patents, it seems plausible that they may incorporate a number of patented inventions – not to mention other sources of value.

Finally, the court applied a multiplying punitive-like factor of 2, apparently trying to strike a balance between a low factor which would be unfair to the patentee who did not agree to the exploitation of their patent, and a high factor which would also be unfair since the patentee did not clearly explain how the patent is directly or indirectly exploited by them and thus how there could be additional economic harm.

As mentioned in the first post on this topic, an additional amount of 6,255 euros was also awarded in terms of financial harm. This additional amount was calculated by the expert (with the approval of the court) based on the long-term interest rate in Germany, and was meant to compensate for the accrued interest that the claimant should have earned based on the collected royalties.

It would be interesting to see whether readers believe that other national courts in other European countries would have likely come up with the same kind of figure or whether there are any marked differences of approaches.


CASE REFERENCE: Tribunal de grande instance de Paris, 3ème chambre, 2ème section, September 26, 2014, Vorwerk & Co. Interholding GmbH v. Electrodomesticos Taurus SL, Lacor Export, Lacor Menaje Profesional SL & Taurus France. RG No. 2008/10729.

Quel dommage – part 1

As interesting as revocation verdicts may be, patents are sometimes found valid and even infringed.

In such a case, a court in France has two main options for determining the amount of damages: either they decide on the quantum in the same ruling in which the patent is found valid and infringed, or they decide on validity and infringement first and then appoint an expert with the task of making a recommendation to them; it is in view of the expert’s report and of further submissions of the parties that the court then determines the quantum.

Damages computation tends to be more detailed and better reasoned in cases of the second category than cases of the first category. Therefore, I thought it would be interesting to have a closer look at one recent case where use was made of an expert, as an example of computation methodology.

On January 11, 2011, the Paris Tribunal de Grande Instance (TGI) held that Electrodomesticos Taurus SL and other codefendants infringed a European patent owned by Vorwerk & Co. Interholdings GmbH by inter alia importing food processors of the brands Mycook and Mycook Pro into France and marketing those on French territory. The TGI appointed an expert and entrusted him with the task of estimating the proper amount of damages.

This second part of the procedure led to another judgment handed down on September 26, 2014 – yes, this is three and a half years later I am afraid. In this judgment, Vorwerk was awarded 127,367 euros of damages corresponding to lost profits, and 6,255 euros corresponding to financial harm. However, since they had already been awarded 310,000 euros as a provision on damages, they in fact had to pay the difference back to the defendants.

This is probably not the end of the story though, since:

  • there may be an appeal pending further to the ruling of September 26, 2014 (any information that readers may have on this question would be welcome);
  • although the initial validity and infringement verdict was confirmed on appeal on February 15, 2013, the Cour de cassation (supreme court) set aside the appeal judgment on November 25, 2014, due to some procedural violation during the appeal proceedings, and remitted the case back to the Cour d’appel in a different composition.

So, on the procedural standpoint, this is a relatively unusual and interesting situation indeed.

Anyway, let’s go back to this amount of damages of 127,367 euros and how it was reasoned by the court.

Vorwerk had not been working the patent itself – although other companies of the same group had apparently been. Therefore, the “lost profits” that they claimed were in fact lost royalties.

In order to assess these lost royalties, a classical two-step process was applied: first, the turnover generated by the infringement (or “infringing mass”) was calculated; second, the royalty rate was assessed.

As to the first step, the court defined the starting point and the end point of the period of time during which infringement took place. The end point was the date of the first judgment on validity and infringement. The plaintiff requested that posterior acts be also taken into account but this request was denied since such posterior acts were prohibited by the injunction pronounced in the first judgment, so that any breach of the injunction should give rise to specific remedies (to be recovered in different proceedings).

The starting point was taken to be three years prior to the commencement of the legal proceedings against the defendants, in keeping with the French statute of limitation (the limitation period has now been extended to 5 years according to new legislation).

One interesting defense raised by some of the codefendants was that they were not “direct infringers so that the starting point should be postponed as far as they were concerned. Under French law, manufacturers or importers of infringing products are defined as direct infringers and are therefore liable for the infringement regardless of whether they were aware of it. In contrast, distributors, users or marketers of infringing products are liable only insofar as they are aware of the infringement – provided that they are different from the manufacturers / importers.

Here, there were four codefendants: two Spanish companies and two French companies. The two French companies argued that they were not direct infringers, and therefore were only liable when they became aware of the infringement, that is when legal proceedings were started against them.

This argument was unsuccessful, as the court did not want to make any difference between the defendants:

It obviously derives from the judgment of January 14, 2011 that the court held Taurus France and Lacor Export [the French companies] liable for the importation acts and did not distinguish their case from that of Taurus Spain and Lacor Spain [the Spanish companies].

Besides, even though these companies are incorporated under French law and are located in France, it results from the statements provided by the defendants to the expert that Taurus France exclusively buys from Taurus Spain, and that Lacor Export handles order placed in France for Lacor Spain, so that they are co-authors of the acts of importation.

Therefore they are liable regardless of any awareness. Consequently, the starting point for the infringement period should be three years prior to the commencement of legal proceedings against each company, as posited by the expert.

The exact date of the starting point was not the same for all companies as legal proceedings were started against them at different points in time, but the take-away message here is that indirect infringers (such as marketers or distributors) having close ties with direct infringers (manufacturers or importers) are not viewed as actual indirect infringers but rather as co-authors of the acts of direct infringement.

Then the court turned to the determination of which articles were infringing. Here, one issue was that some food processors were sold with a steam cooking cover while others were not. The court analyzed the first judgment and deduced from this judgment that the patent infringement was related to the presence of the steam cooking cover. Food processors sold without a steam cooking cover were not infringing. On the other hand, the defendants also marketed steam cooking covers independently of (the main part of) the food processors.

A steam cooking cover for humans.
A steam cooking cover for humans

The court decided that the number of infringing articles corresponded to the sum of (1) food processors sold with a steam cooking cover and (2) steam cooking covers sold separately. The court’s reasoning was that standalone steam cooking covers were necessarily meant to be used with food processors previously sold without a cover. Therefore, the sum of (1) and (2) should indeed be equal to the number of cover-equipped food processors held by end users.

Based on the definition of the relevant period of time and of the relevant articles, the court was able to compute the overall turnover generated by the infringement – based on the numbers provided in the expert’s report.

In the second post on this topic, we will look at the second main step of damages assessment, namely the computation of the royalty rate.


CASE REFERENCE: Tribunal de grande instance de Paris, 3ème chambre, 2ème section, September 26, 2014, Vorwerk & Co. Interholding GmbH v. Electrodomesticos Taurus SL, Lacor Export, Lacor Menaje Profesional SL & Taurus France. RG No. 2008/10729.