IPCom-tinuation

Traditionally, patent litigation has a tendency to endlessly drag on.

Think about the pravastatin case in France for example (which I am not brave enough to keep reporting on).

But some cases are really fast movers. Such is IPCom v. Lenovo. In my previous post, published a couple of weeks ago, I reported on the anti-anti-suit injunction issued by the judge in charge of emergency interim proceedings (juge des référés) on November 8, 2019.

The ink on the post was barely dry, or its pixels were barely on, or whatever the right metaphor is, that the Paris Cour d’appel issued its ruling further to Lenovo’s appeal against the November 8 judgment (first brought to my attention by Jérôme Tassi on LinkedIn).

For a detailed summary of the facts of the case, please refer to the previous post.

For the most part, the appeal judges agreed with the juge des référés.

They confirmed that she had jurisdiction over the petition filed by the would-be licensee / infringement defendant Lenovo under article 46 Code de procédure civile, as IPCom would suffer a potential harm in France if the anti-suit injunction were issued in the U.S., affecting IPCom’s right to sue in France.

They also held that the anti-suit injunction, if issued by the Californian judge, would be a manifestly unlawful disturbance, in view of the French courts’ exclusive jurisdiction on matters of infringement of patent rights on the French territory, and in view of the property rights and the right to a fair trial enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights and in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. This was true even if the potential anti-suit injunction was only temporary. Therefore, the juge des référés was right when she ordered Lenovo to withdraw the motion for anti-suit injunction in the U.S.

However, the court canceled the second part of the référé order, which prohibited Lenovo from filing any other similar motion in front of any foreign court. This is because there is no longer any such motion currently pending, and no indication that a similar motion would be filed again. Therefore, the above manifestly unlawful disturbance has ceased and there is no imminent threat of the same.

In summary, there is formally no more anti-anti-suit injunction in place in France. But since the court agreed with the juge des référés‘ assessment, it would probably be unwise for Lenovo to give it another try.

But this is not the only development of the case that I would like to report on.

An even more interesting twist is that, in parallel to the ongoing FRAND determination lawsuit in the U.S., IPCom sued Lenovo (et al.) for patent infringement in France based on EP 1841628 (hence, of course, the anti-suit discussion in the first place). In addition to the action on the merits, IPCom also filed a motion for preliminary injunction (PI) in front of the juge des référés (not the same one as the one who issued the anti-anti-suit injunction, mind you).

On January 20, 2020, the judge issued his judgment, rejecting IPCom’s motion for PI.

I will skip the first part of the judgment, which deals with an alleged invalidity of the complaint – the argument did not work but is worth looking at if only to have the pleasure of reading a reference to the ordinance of Villers-Cotterêts of 1539, the oldest piece of legislation still in force in France, enacted more than 250 years before the monarchy started losing its head.

I will also skip the second part of the judgment, in which Lenovo disputed IPCom’s standing to sue, challenging the chain of transfer of the patent and the recordal of this chain of transfer with the French patent register. This objection was also rejected by the judge.

No, the real interesting part is the discussion on the merits of IPCom’s motion.

Remarkably, the judge heavily relied on the Enforcement Directive (2004/48/EC) and more specifically on the 22nd recital:

It is also essential to provide for provisional measures for the immediate termination of infringements, without awaiting a decision on the substance of the case, while observing the rights of the defence, ensuring the proportionality of the provisional measures as appropriate to the characteristics of the case in question and providing the guarantees needed to cover the costs and the injury caused to the defendant by an unjustified request. Such measures are particularly justified where any delay would cause irreparable harm to the holder of an intellectual property right.

Although the Code de la propriété intellectuelle does not explicitly mention this principle of proportionality of provisional measures, the judge considered that it does apply.

And in the present case, he considered that this proportionality principle would be breached if the preliminary injunction was ordered as requested by the patent proprietor.

Is there a proportionality issue here?

Here are a couple of important facts to bear in mind in this case.

First, the EP’628 patent was declared as essential for the UMTS (3G) standard. Therefore, it is supposed to be implemented by all laptops, mobile phones and tablets of the defendants (marketed under the brands Lenovo, ThinkPad and Yoga). The motion for PI accordingly targeted all of these devices.

Second, the EP’628 patent was set to expire on February 15, 2020. Therefore, the PI, if issued, would just last for a few weeks.

The judge stated that the PI would be justified if IPCom could demonstrate that the infringement of the patent was likely, but also that the absence of a PI would cause harm which could not be repaired by damages. The judge further stated that the negative economic consequences for the defendants should also be taken into account, and more specifically whether they could be adequately repaired if the patent were ultimately found invalid or not infringed.

IPCom argued that it would suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a PI due to the annihilation of the value of its patent portfolio.

The judge was unpersuaded, as IPCom cannot lose any market share, because it does not market any devices. The sole harm suffered by IPCom is the lack of license revenues, which can be repaired by damages to be set by the court at a later stage.

The judge further noted that a PI would have long-lasting effects on the market even after the upcoming expiry of the patent on February 15, 2020, since the public would turn away from the Motorola, Lenovo, ThinkPad and Yoga devices. The loss of income would thus be very large. In addition, a recall of products from the market would tarnish the corporate image of the defendants in the long run and significantly disrupt distribution networks. In short, the PI and recall of products from the market would result in negative economic consequences which could not be adequately repaired by damages, if IPCom were to ultimately not prevail on the merits.

The judge’s conclusion was the following:

[…] The requested measures, set to last for a few weeks in view of the expiry date of the patent of February 15, 2020, are manifestly disproportionate and may result in an imbalance in the situation of the parties conferring an undue advantage to the patentee which may then be able to impose a license not meeting with FRAND requirements. 

Frankly, I don’t really see how the judge could possibly have decided otherwise. The message is clear: SEP owners need to be more reasonable when they go to court.

In the meantime, the parties seem to be back to square one.


CASE REFERENCES:

Cour d’appel de Paris, pôle 5 chambre 16, March 3, 2020, Lenovo Inc. et al. v. IPCom GmbH & Co. KG, RG No. 19/21426.

Tribunal judiciaire de Paris, ordonnance de référé, January 20, 2020, IPCom GmbH & Co. KG v. Lenovo SAS et al., RG No. 19/60318.

Haunted

In the patent profession, cases have this way of always coming back at us.

You may work hard on a case and complete a difficult action, possibly with some sense of achievement (or relief). But then, a few months or years later, the case is back with a vengeance.

Happy about the way you have drafted your patent application, having navigated through all of the prior art and the inventor’s wishes? Wait until you get the search report. Enjoying your ride or flight back home after having been steam-rollered in opposition oral proceedings? Let’s meet again in 2 years’ time for the appeal. Satisfied that you have managed to digest the other party’s 300-page submissions just in time to file your reply in court? As well you should, although next time you will get 350 pages from them.

And so it is with this blog.

Almost exactly 2 years ago, I published a post on Ethypharm SAS v. Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. 

Now that the appeal judgment has been handed down, it seems like a good time to revisit this litigation.

Most appeal judgments in France confirm the first instance decisions (it is said that the confirmation rate is around 80%). But this one did not confirm, which makes it all the more interesting.

As a reminder, the case pitches Ethypharm as a nullity plaintiff against Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. (MSD), defendant and owner of the patent in suit, EP 1455756.

The first topic addressed in my previous post was the assessment of whether the action was time-barred. On this aspect, the appeal judges came to the same conclusion as their colleagues below, with a slightly different reasoning.

The TGI had decided that the starting point for the 5-year limitation period was the date of the EPO Board of appeal’s decision (July 7, 2014), announced during the oral proceedings, per which the patent under opposition was to be maintained in amended form.

As noted in my post, this finding was already a deviation from earlier case law.

The Paris Cour d’appel took an even later date as a starting point, namely the day on which the amended patent was published by the EPO (September 23, 2015). Said the court: “this is when the modified patent became opposable to third parties“.

An entirely reasonable finding, but which makes it more difficult than ever to know and predict how this limitation period should be computed in general. Case law keeps going all over the place. Fortunately, the statute has now been amended so as to take away this disastrous limitation period. We will still have to live with this legal mess, but less and less so.

The other notable point in my earlier post was that I felt there may be some contradiction in the TGI’s position regarding sufficiency on the one hand and inventive step on the other hand.

As a reminder which is probably quite necessary (at least for me), claim 1 reads as follows:

A nanoparticulate composition comprising the compound 2-(R)-(1-(R)-(3,5-bis(trifluoromethyl)phenyl)ethoxy)-3-(S)-(4-fluoro)phenyl-4-(3-(5-oxo-1H,4H-1,2,4-triazolo)methylmorpholine [a.k.a. aprepitant], or a pharmaceutically acceptable salt thereof, the compound having adsorbed on the surface thereof at least one surface stabilizer in an amount sufficient to maintain an effective average particle size of less than about 1000 nm; where “effective average particle size of less than about 1000 nm” means that at least 95% of the particles, by weight, have a particle size of less than about 1000 nm.

Ethypharm’s insufficiency challenge failed at first instance, as the court noted that there was a prior U.S. patent disclosing the so-called “Nanocrystal” method, for making nanoparticles with a surface modifier adsorbed thereon, having an average size of less than 400 nm. This Nanocrystal patent also taught that such nanoparticles improve the bioavailability of poorly water-soluble actives.

Ethypharm also argued lack of inventive step of claim 1 over this Nanocrystal patent, but the attack failed. The lower court held that the teaching of the Nanocrystal patent could not be applied in an obvious manner to aprepitant, and that there were many technical uncertainties.

I was not completely comfortable with the articulation between both positions.

Maybe the appeal judges also had trouble with this approach: while they agreed that the invention was sufficiently disclosed in the patent, they held that it lacked inventive step.

Starting with sufficiency, the court tackled plausibility, an essential phase of most pharma cases. The court repeated the now well-established French criterion per which the patent must “directly and unambiguously reflect the therapeutic effect” at stake. But then they added that “it is not systematically required that the description of the patent should contain tests, this condition is not required in case of a product claim”. A helpful comment, quite in line with the Boards of appeal’s stance on the matter.

The court further remarked that the patent in suit made reference to the U.S. Nanocrystal patent, which made it plausible for the skilled person that nanoparticulate aprepitant had improved bioavailability. Ethypharm did not demonstrate that this was not the case and thus did not discharge its burden of proof. In fact, it appears that some test reports were filed by the plaintiff to support the sufficiency challenge, but they were deemed inconclusive.

Turning then to inventive step, MSD’s case was that increasing bioavailability was a complex problem, and that there were many parameters to be taken into account.

To them, reducing the size of aprepitant particles to less than 1000 nm was not an approach that the skilled person would have used.

But the court relied on expert’s evidence showing that the dissolution rate is often a limiting factor in bioavailability; and that reducing the particle size of a drug makes it possible to increase the contact surface area between the undissolved active and the solvent, which generally increases the dissolution rate. Reference was made in particular to a 1982 textbook.

MSD countered that reducing the particle size to less than 1000 nm was not commonly practiced at the priority date, and had been little explored. The court was not persuaded. Some nanoparticulate drugs were tested already in the 1990s, and it had been proposed in a general manner that a poorly soluble drug could be reduced to a nano size. The Nanocrystal technology of course was also taken into consideration. Not just the patent, but also a press release by Elan Technologies, according to which their process was broadly applicable to many poorly soluble actives.

MSD further relied on a document showing that micronization of aprepitant did not give satisfactory results, so as to show that the skilled person would not have continued with this approach. But the document was an internal one and the skilled person would of course not have been aware of it.

In the end, the court did not deny that there were several possible approaches for the skilled person, but found that the nanoparticulate approach was nevertheless obvious to try:

Even if the skilled person knew of other methods and if the EP’299 patent only showed tests on three different active ingredients, he […] knew that nanonization improved the bioavailability of poorly soluble active substances and was thus incited, based on converging information […], to start research on this pathway in order to improve the bioavailability of aprepitant when used as a drug.

The Board of appeal decision per which the patent was maintained in amended form, namely T 210/11 (Board 3.3.07) reached an opposite conclusion of course:

It results that the skilled person, looking for a solution to the problem as defined above, faces multiple possible solutions to said problem of low bioavailability of aprepitant, and would not be conducted by the teaching of documents (5), (6) or (7) to the use of a nano-particulate composition of aprepitant.

Ethypharm was not a party to the opposition proceedings at the EPO, and the Paris court may have been presented with additional evidence that the Board did not see.

But my overall impression is that this is basically a matter of the court and the board placing the inventive step bar at different heights. This may be one of those grey-area cases, with complex facts to consider, which may very well go one way or the other depending on who looks at them.

This is the end of the story – for now, unless there is a cassation appeal and the case comes back to haunt this blog again.

Here it comes again.

CASE REFERENCE: Cour d’appel de Paris, pôle 5 chambre 1, October 29, 2019, SAS Ethypharm v. Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp., RG No.18/03876.

Patent still standing

The appraisal of standing in patent nullity suits in France is complex and harsh. The topic has been addressed in a number posts, for instance this one, that one or that other one.

The ruling commented upon today revisits the issue, in a quite unusual way.

Today’s case relates to the LEVOTHYROX® controversy.

LEVOTHYROX® is a drug containing a manufactured form of the thyroid hormone thyroxine (T4). It is used to treat thyroid hormone deficiency. The drug is marketed in France by Merck Biopharma.

According to a press release, the French health authorities (ANSM) requested a modification of the formulation so as to better stabilize the active upon storage. In March 2017, Merck Biopharma thus switched to a new formulation containing different excipients. A few months later, a number of patients complained about side effects seemingly caused by the new formulation. A couple hundred thousand people signed a petition demanding that the old formulation be put back on the market.

The existence and the origin of the side effects were hotly debated and I am not aware that any consensus has been reached yet as to what may have gone wrong.

Anyway, it turns out that there is also an IP aspect to this matter. Indeed, European patent EP 2885005 B1, owned by Merck Patent GmbH, protects the new LEVOTHYROX® formulation. Claim 1 is directed to a solid pharmaceutical preparation comprising levothyroxine sodium, gelatin, citric acid and a filler.

In December 2018, 139 individuals claiming to be patients affected by side effects related to the new LEVOTHYROX® formulation filed a lawsuit in front of the Paris TGI, requesting the revocation of the EP’005 patent. They were later joined by 34 additional individuals as well as a patient association, Alerte Thyroïde.

As a defense, Merck Patent GmbH claimed that the plaintiffs lacked standing. A hearing on this defense took place on December 4, 2019, and the judgment has just been handed down. The court has sided with Merck and dismissed the nullity suit for lack of standing.

To some extent, the outcome is unsurprising. As I said in the beginning, the appraisal of standing in patent nullity suits is harsh – excessively so, in my view. If even competitors of a patent owner are sometimes considered as lacking standing, a reasonable gut feeling would be that there is no way individual patients or even a patient association can have standing.

But in fact, looking at the reasons for the decision, the court seems to have actually walked a fine line when deciding the issue.

The starting point in the reasoning is article 31 Code de procédure civile, per which “any person having a legitimate interest in having a claim accepted or rejected may initiate legal proceedings, except if the law restricts the possibility to sue to specific persons […]“.

First, the court recalled the usual criteria that are applied when the litigants are competitors:

When the nullity action relates to two competing parties, the advantage expected from the action under article 31 Code de procédure civile is traditionally understood […] as being an improvement in the legal situation of the plaintiff. It is generally requested from said plaintiff that they should demonstrate the existence of a sufficient interest to free a future exploitation of the patented technology or a similar one. 

But then the court accepted that non-competitors, including members of the general public, could also have standing under article 31:

However, […] the competition / economic case is not the only situation in which a nullity suit could be initiated, and cannot define standing, which by nature is shape-shifting. Therefore, the standing of the plaintiffs, who are not competitors of the proprietor of the patent at stake but consumers and patients directly impacted, notably in terms of material and financial availability of the drug subject to a monopoly, must be appraised in concreto, based on the object and the purpose of the nullity suit […], without neglecting the fact that such an action, which aims at terminating any undue monopoly, is also useful for the general interest, since a revocation would benefit to all. 

There are different ways to achieve standing.

In other terms, the court did not completely close the door to the initiation of patent nullity proceedings by non-traditional plaintiffs. The notion of “general interest” in the last sentence is in fact pretty far-reaching.

The court went on in the following terms:

In fact, whether the grant of a patent is a compensation for investments and efforts made by the creator of the invention or for the disclosure of the invention, it confers a beneficial monopoly to its owner, and additionally an undeniable control over prices. In a context of free competition and free innovation, this is legitimate and admissible only if the validity conditions are met. It is of general interest, in particular in the pharmaceutical field and in case public prosecution, which is first and foremost in charge of defending general interest, fails to act, that an end should be put to the monopoly when the patent is invalid or merely aims at preserving a monopoly conferred by a previous patent about to expire, thus allowing competing generic pharmaceutical companies to offer accessible generic drugs at a lower cost to patients in need of the initially patented drugs. 

I have never heard of a public prosecutor filing a patent nullity suit to open up a market. But the court, based on the above statements, seems to accept the possibility that members of the public could take up this role.

In this respect, the plaintiffs precisely argued that the patent generally protects any levothyroxine formulation containing citric acid, gelatin and any filler, so that the existence of the patent prevents competitors from marketing alternative formulations with other fillers. This is relevant because the filler used in the new LEVOTHYROX® formulation, namely mannitol, was suspected to be responsible for the side effects.

The court responded to the argument as follows:

It is true that, by suppressing the monopoly on [the new formulation] in France, the revocation of the French part of the EP’005 patent […] would not only make it possible to market generics of this drug with perhaps a reduced price, but would also make it possible for other laboratories to make a formulation identical to the old formulation of LEVOTHYROX, which is, according to the plaintiffs, currently impossible because it may infringe the patent at stake which unduly covers the old formulation. 

However, as rightly noted by the defendant, the potential success of the nullity suit would not result in the automatic production and marketing of the old formulation […], which currently no longer benefits from a marketing authorization. 

[…]

The causal link between the nullity suit and the expected effect, namely that Merck or a third party should resume the manufacturing and marketing of [the old formulation] thus appears to be purely hypothetical and may not improve the legal and/or economical situation of the plaintiffs, so that they do not have standing in this case. 

In summary, the ultimate goal of the plaintiffs was to have a different levothyroxine drug available on the market. The court acknowledged that the revocation of the patent would be helpful for this goal. But it would not automatically result in the achievement of the goal, as a MA for a different drug would still be necessary – and is currently lacking.

To my mind, the reasoning is not really satisfactory. Has the court considered that a pharma company may not want to take the pain of requesting a new MA if a patent stands in the way? Therefore, can’t the revocation of the patent be considered as a necessary prerequisite for achieving the claimants’ stated goal?

At the risk of oversimplifying the discussion, shouldn’t any person or company willing to spend the (sometimes considerable) time and effort needed to revoke a patent be presumed to have a legitimate interest in the revocation? Shouldn’t the standing bar be lowered so as to only set aside abusive and frivolous lawsuits?


CASE REFERENCE: Tribunal de grande instance de Paris, 3ème chambre 3ème section, January 24, 2020, Alerte Thyroïde et al. v. Merck Patent GmbH, RG No. 18/14575.

Where is the finish line?

Did you think you would never hear again of the thrilling subject of the French statute of limitations, and of its very controversial application to patent nullity suits? Well, think again.

In a previous post on the loi PACTE, I mentioned that the new provision putting an end to the time bar on patent nullity suits would immediately enter into force but that it remained to be seen how this would be interpreted in practice.

And so it is that, after spending lots of ink and pixels on how the statute of limitations applies to patent nullity actions, we may now have to devote more ink and pixels to a discussion on how exactly the statute will no longer apply.

Without further ado, as they say, I will now leave the floor to Matthieu Dhenne who will provide his insight on this matter.

I would like to come back to an issue close to my heart, as readers of this blog already know: the limitation period of actions for the annulment of industrial property titles.

I will not recall here the entire debate, already mentioned many times on this blog. The issue can be summarized by recalling that French judges applied a 5-year limitation period of the French Civil Code to these actions and that a debate has arisen about this case law, in particular because of the disastrous solutions to which it led.

The legislator has since intervened to combat this case law by declaring that these actions shall not be time-barred.

But a new debate is starting to emerge. Indeed, French Act No. 2019-486 of May 22, 2019, on the growth and transformation of companies – known as the “PACTE Act” – specifies that actions for the annulment of industrial property titles are not subject to any limitation period, while providing that that this applies to the “titles in force on the day of its publication“.

How should we interpret this provision?

The statute of limitations – the finish line.

Let us immediately rule out the interpretation according to which the parliament, by aiming at the titles in force on the day of the publication of the act, has excluded, on the contrary, the titles that were not (yet) in force on this date. This interpretation is disqualified, because it makes no sense. Indeed, we cannot consider that a transitional provision may have another object than transitional law, which deals with the application of an Act to past facts (i.e. facts that happened prior to its entry into force).

Only one question seems interesting with regard to the transitional provision discussed here: could it induce a retroactive effect by applying to titles in force on the day of the publication of the act, even though this day is after the limitation period has expired?

For instance, could a Court of Appeal apply the new Act to a case in which the limitation period applied at first instance? We should recall that the prevailing principle in French Law is that of the non-retroactivity of new laws, which is deduced from Article 2 of the French Civil Code; and that its counterpart is the immediate effect of new laws. Article 2222 of the same Code specifies that the limitation period, once expired, cannot be called into question.

The legislator may, however, provide, by way of exception, for the retroactivity of a law, if this is clearly and sufficiently stated. In this case, Article 124 of the PACTE Act does not specifically state that it is “retroactive”, but this is not required by Article 2 of the Civil Code or by the interpretation of the French Supreme Court (Cour de Cassation). Moreover, the specific mention that the law is “retroactive” would, as such, be of little use because it would be too vague.

Except if one considered that a specific reference to retroactivity is indeed mandatory – which the Cour de Cassation has never held – there is no evidence to suggest that the transitional provision in question is not clear or sufficient. We are therefore in a situation where it will be up to the judges to interpret the provision as closely as possible to the spirit of the text.

It must be kept in mind that the legislator intended to put an end to a jurisprudence that was belied by its text. It was therefore appropriate to refrain from restricting its application either to ongoing trials or to proceedings for annulment introduced after its entry into force or to actions for annulment based on titles issued after its entry into force. On the contrary, the text had to be worded in such a way that it could apply to all titles in force, which included all the aforementioned cases, but also titles previously issued and which had not given rise to legal proceedings on the date of the publication of the law.

Thus, the wording “titles in force on the day of its publication” seems to cover all pending and future actions and seems therefore retroactive.

I will have the opportunity to come back in more detail to this subject next week on @DeBoufflers Blog and then in the journal Propriété Industrielle (December issue); the latter will include a detailed response to an article supporting the opposite thesis, which was published in the same journal this summer.

Thank you Matthieu.

Transitional provisions are often tricky and can give rise to divided case law.

We have been there before, when the number of courts having jurisdiction in patent matters was reduced from 10 to 7 and then down to 1. And so, I would not be surprised if we got surprised again.

The art of the seal

The new set of rules recently adopted in France on the protection of trade secrets can potentially affect many aspects of IP litigation, including in particular the handling of evidence that may contain confidential information.

New judgments are therefore bound to come under scrutiny in order to determine whether there is a change in practice or not: in particular is there any heightened effort by the courts to preserve the parties’ confidential information? In Conversant v. LG, it seemed that maybe there was.

But as far as today’s ruling is concerned, I am not so sure the recent law had any impact on the judge’s assessment of seized evidence.

Here is the context.

Bayer Intellectual Property GmbH owns European patent No. EP 2164496, on a formulation for treating coccidiose and iron deficiency in farm animals, such as piglets.

In November 2017, the French company Ceva Santé Animale let Bayer know that they intended to launch a veterinary product in several European countries, and Bayer replied that the product would infringe their patent. Ceva nevertheless continued to prepare for the launch of the product.

The dispute suddenly crystallized a few months ago. First, Ceva obtained a marketing authorization for their product, Forceris, in April 2019. Then, on May 16, oral proceedings took place in connection with Ceva’s opposition against EP’496 at the EPO, and the opposition division rejected the opposition. On the same day, Bayer sent a cease-and-desist letter to Ceva. Ceva postponed the launch in the Netherlands and agreed to give Bayer a 2-month advance notice prior to such launch. But no similar undertaking was made with respect to France.

Still on May 16 (definitely a busy day for Bayer’s legal team), an ex parte order for infringement seizure was issued. The seizure was carried out 4 days later at Ceva’s headquarters.

Ceva immediately filed a motion in court to request the placement of the seized documents and information under seal.

In fact, the bailiff who performed the seizure had spontaneously placed some of the seized evidence under seal and had redacted some of the seized information – but Ceva deemed that this was not enough.

The interim order further to Ceva’s motion was issued on June 7.

With piglets, there is always money at stake.

In summary, Ceva argued that Bayer did not need the seizure, as they already had information on the composition of the Forceris product; and that the seized information was highly confidential and could unfairly distort competition if revealed to Bayer.

Unsurprisingly, Bayer disagreed and requested on the contrary that the evidence placed under seal by the bailiff should be released to them.

In her order, the judge first noted that Bayer’s knowledge of technical information on the allegedly infringing product (due to prior exchanges between the parties) was irrelevant.

Indeed, the infringement seizure procedure aims at collecting evidence relating not only to the existence of an infringement, but also to the extent of the infringement.

Second, she noted that the provisions on the protection of trade secrets not only apply to seized exhibits, but also to mentions contained in the bailiff’s report:

[…] The abovementioned provision (article R. 615-2 par. 5) only cites “seized exhibits” but  it must also apply to mentions in the infringement seizure report which derive from these exhibits. Otherwise, as stated by Ceva, the protection of trade secrets would be circumvented simply by mentioning the contents of the seized documents in the report. 

Pragmatic and fair.

Then, the judge deemed that a redaction of the bailiff’s report was not required in this case; nor was the placement under seal of most of the seized exhibits.

Here is the standard to be applied, as reminded in the order:

The judge of the infringement seizure should only order justified and proportionate measures, taking into account the opposite interests and rights at stake: on the one hand, [the interests and rights] of the seized party to enjoy the protection of its trade secrets and confidential information, if it can prove this qualification; and on the other hand, [the interests and rights] of the proprietor to gain access to any relevant documents which may enable to characterize the infringement, even before any finding by the court as to the existence of the infringement, including confidential information, provided that it appears to be necessary for demonstrating infringement, in order not to deprive the infringement seizure of any efficacy. 

I don’t think this standard is substantially different from the one that was traditionally applied before the 2018 trade secret law.

In this case, the judge refused to seal information appearing on one page of the bailiff’s report and in two seized exhibits, relating to commercial plans regarding Forceris.

Ceva stated that Bayer could use the information to adjust the launch of its own competing product, Boycox Iron. But the judge noted that “the countries [where Forceris is to be marketed] are more or less those countries where pigs are raised“. In other terms, the information was obvious and not protected.

I am not sure this reasoning is completely convincing, especially in view of the “more or less” language (“peu ou prou” in the original version).

The judge further noted that the business plan had already been disclosed in the Dutch proceedings, so that the information was not confidential. This, to me, is a much stronger point.

One of the exhibits contained the price of the Forceris product. But the judge also refused to seal it.

The first reason was that Bayer needed the information for the assessment of damages. The second reason was that Ceva has disclosed its recommended price in Italy, so that the judge could not see why the information would be confidential in France (even if the French price was different from the Italian price).

Again, I tend to find this latter reason not fully satisfactory. The fact that a company has decided not to keep some information confidential does not mean that they have given up on confidentiality of all information.

As for the usefulness of the price for the computation of damages, this is of course a central point. In some cases, courts have decided that there should be a ruling on infringement first, before the patentee can access any price-related information. But in other cases, such as this one, they have decided otherwise. This is a delicate case-by-case balance, which, again, has apparently not really been altered by the new trade secrets provisions.

Other exhibits were OKed by the judge as well, as they related to invoices, orders and the like and were therefore relevant for the patentee as they contained information on the distribution network.

Only one exhibit was withheld by the judge, namely some commercial documentation which “it does not appear justified and proportionate to disclose to Bayer in view of the information already collected“.

On the other hand, the judge granted Bayer’s counterclaim for disclosure of the evidence spontaneously placed under seal by the bailiff during the seizure.

The last nail in the coffin was the following sentence:

There is no legitimate reason to prohibit Bayer from using the elements [thus] lawfully obtained in other proceedings in France or abroad. 

This is an important reminder of how useful the French infringement seizure can be in a situation of global litigation.

All in all, the judge’s ruling seems to favor efficiency of the proceedings: lengthy expertise proceedings on the exhibits are avoided, and the patentee has now all the necessary information to sue other parties if needed, and file submissions on all aspects of the case including damages. But whether the defendant’s trade secrets were sufficiently preserved in the process may be open for discussion – with the caveat that, as is often the case, the order is relatively brief and does not make it possible to fully appraise the entire context.


CASE REFERENCE: Tribunal de grande instance de Paris, ordonnance de référé, June 7, 2019, Ceva Santé Animale SA v. Bayer Intellectual Property GmbH, RG No. 19/54542.