A risky launch at risk

Launching at risk is not a business for those who have a weak stomach.

Once a generic drug company has decided that it will go on the market despite the existence of an IP threat – e.g. because they have determined that the IP right at stake is probably invalid or unenforceable – then anything can happen, and it may happen really fast.

Today’s decision illustrates the risks of a launch at risk.

GD Searle LLC owns European patent No. EP 0810209 filed on August 24, 1993. The patent is directed to a family of antiretroviral drugs, more precisely protease inhibitors, useful for the treatment of HIV infection.

On May 9, 2008, Searle obtained a Supplementary Protection Certificate (SPC) from the French patent office (INPI), under No. FR 07C0034. This SPC is based on the EP’209 patent and relates to “darunavir or one of its pharmaceutically acceptable salts, esters or precursors“.

An exclusive license to the SPC was granted to Janssen Sciences Ireland Unlimited Company and then a sub-license was granted to its French affiliate Janssen-Cilag SAS. Janssen (Johnson & Johnson group) markets a drug known as Prezista®, the active compound of which is darunavir.

SAS Sandoz is a French affiliate of the Sandoz group (affiliated to Novartis). As readers have probably already guessed by now, Sandoz launched a generic version of Prezista® before the expiry of the French SPC – which is set to take place on February 23, 2019.

Another form of launch at risk.

The parties have been entangled in pan-European litigation over the darunavir SPCs. This litigation actually hit the headlines when, on January 25, 2018, the British Court of Appeal referred a question to the CJEU in relation with the validity of the British SPC.

The case is still pending and was allocated number C-114/18.

The issue at stake is the following.

Claim 1 of the EP’209 patent is a so-called Markush claim.

A Markush claim covers a large class of chemical compounds by way of a generic formula, without reciting them individually. In this case, the generic formula contained in claim 1 is the following:

Each group among P1, P2, R2, R3 and R4 is defined as being selected among of list of possible options. I will spare you the complete lists here. But it may be important to note that each list itself recites generic classes of groups, rather than individualized groups. For instance P1 and P2 can be alkoxycarbonyl groups, aralkoxycarbonyl groups, alkylcarbonyl groups, etc. Each of these options encompasses an unknown number of individual possibilities. In the end, the array of choices falling under the generic formula is practically unlimited.

Well, not quite. In fact the number of theoretical possibilities was estimated in the British litigation to be from 7 x 10135 to 1 x 10377. Not a very accurate estimate, but let’s not skimp on a couple hundred zeros.

Now, darunavir has the following structure:

It turns out to be one of the zillion compounds covered by claim 1

Several other claims of the patent also cover darunavir, but always in a generic way. Darunavir is not cited in the patent, not exemplified, nor singled out in any other manner.

Now, according to famous / infamous article 3(a) of the so-called SPC Regulation (Regulation (EC) No. 469/2009):

A certificate shall be granted if, in the Member State in which the application referred to in Article 7 is submitted and at the date of that application:

(a) the product is protected by a basic patent in force […].

As regular readers of this blog are well aware, people have been arguing, fighting and spending millions and millions of euros for a number of years over what it means for a product to be protected by a basic patent.

Some (limited) guidance has been offered by the CJEU over time.

For instance, this is from the Medeva judgment (C-322/10):

Article 3(a) of [the SPC Regulation] must be interpreted as precluding the [grant on an] SPC relating to active ingredients which are not specified in the wording of the claims of the basic patent relied on in support of the SPC application.

Then there is the Eli Lilly judgment (C-493/12):

Article 3(a) of [the SPC Regulation] must be interpreted as meaning that, in order for an active ingredient to be regarded as ‘protected by a basic patent in force’ within the meaning of that provision, it is not necessary for the active ingredient to be identified in the claims of the patent by a structural formula. Where the active ingredient is covered by a functional formula in the claims of a patent issued by the EPO, Article 3(a) of that regulation does not, in principle, preclude the grant of an SPC for that active ingredient, on condition that it is possible to reach the conclusion on the basis of those claims, interpreted inter alia in the light of the description of the invention, as required by Article 69 of the EPC and the Protocol on the interpretation of that provision, that the claims relate, implicitly but necessarily and specifically, to the active ingredient in question […].

And let’s not forget about Teva (C-121/17):

Article 3(a) of [the SPC Regulation] must be interpreted as meaning that a product composed of several active ingredients with a combined effect is ‘protected by a basic patent in force’ within the meaning of that provision where, even if the combination of active ingredients of which that product is composed is not expressly mentioned in the claims of the basic patent, those claims relate necessarily and specifically to that combination. For that purpose, from the point of view of a person skilled in the art and on the basis of the prior art at the filing date or priority date of the basic patent: the combination of those active ingredients must necessarily, in the light of the description and drawings of that patent, fall under the invention covered by that patent, and each of those active ingredients must be specifically identifiable, in the light of all the information disclosed by that patent.

And there are a few other relevant ones.

But the thing is, the CJEU has never ruled so far on how article 3(a) should be applied with respect to a Markush claim. So, in this case, should darunavir be considered as being “specified in the wording of the claims” (as per Medeva)? Is it possible to conclude that the claim “relates, implicitly but necessarily and specifically“, to darunavir (as per Eli Lilly)? Or is this not a relevant question as the claim should not be considered as a functional claim? Or maybe a combination of substituents in a Markush formula should be treated like a combination of active compounds, so that it should be investigated whether, “from the point of view of a person skilled in the art and on the basis of the prior art at the filing date or priority date of the basic patent“, each of the substituents is “specifically identifiable, in the light of all the information disclosed by that patent” (as per Teva)?

Of particular interest in this case is that, not only was darunavir not known as a compound at the filing date and was only made available several years later; but group P1 of the generic formula, when the formula applies to darunavir, can be considered as an unusual group at the filing date, which does not form part of common general knowledge.

The British Court of appeal thus proposed the following question for the CJEU:

Where the sole active ingredient the subject of [an SPC] issued under [the SPC Regulation] is a member of a class of compounds which fall within a Markush definition in a claim of the patent, all of which class members embody the core inventive technical advance of the patent, is it sufficient for the purposes of Article 3(a) of the SPC Regulation that the compound would, upon examination of its structure, immediately be recognised as one which falls within the class (and therefore would be protected by the patent as a matter of national patent law) or must the specific substituents necessary to form the active ingredient be amongst those which the skilled person could derive, based on their common general knowledge, from a reading of the patent claims?

And this now brings us to France.

Sandoz obtained a Marketing authorization (MA) for the generic version of Prezista® on December 15, 2017. Searle and Janssen issued multiple warnings to Sandoz and then discovered in December 2018 that the generic drug (Darunavir Sandoz) was on the French market.

On December 14, 2018, they filed a complaint against Sandoz in urgency proceedings (référé d’heure à heure) for infringement of their SPC No. FR’034 – after getting an authorization to do so from the court.

Sandoz’ sole defense relied on the invalidity of the SPC for non-compliance with art. 3(a) the SPC Regulation. 

The hearing took place one week only after the filing of the complaint, on December 21, 2018. Then the judge Ms. Lignières took the case home during the Christmas break and issued her decision on January 11, 2019, ruling against Sandoz.

In the decision, the judge analyzed the CJEU case law and came to the conclusion that the Eli Lilly test is not applicable to a Markush claim:

It should be noted that, in the Eli Lilly decision, the case related to a functional claim, so that the CJEU insisted on a double condition of necessity and specificity. In the present case, the claims of the basic patent are structural and better allow the skilled person to determined in view of the claims whether the active compound protected by the SPC was covered by the basic patent. 

Then, after analyzing the formula of claim 1 of the patent and the various meanings of the variable groups in this claim and some of the dependent claims, the court concluded that:

Therefore darunavir is identified by the skilled person as being implicitly but necessarily and specifically protected by the EP’209 patent in view of the substituents identified in the claims, in keeping with the requirements of article 3(a) of the EC Regulation and of the CJEU case law.

The judge thus considered that the defendant did not prove that the SPC was manifestly invalid.

Accordingly, a preliminary injunction was ordered, under a 50,000 euro-penalty per violation of the injunction. The judge also ordered a seizure of the infringing drugs, as well as a product recall.

I don’t have an exhaustive view of the pan-European Searle v. Sandoz litigation, but at least in the Netherlands a similar preliminary ruling was issued a couple of months earlier: see here.

In a recent post I wondered whether there was a surge in preliminary injunctions in France these days. The darunavir case seems to provide a confirmation. 

We will have to wait for the CJEU ruling to know whether the French judge correctly guessed which way the Luxembourg winds will finally blow.

But at any rate this decision should reassure IP right holders. A very quick preliminary decision can be issued in France when time is of the essence. Therefore, launching a generic drug a couple of months before the expiry of the IP at stake does not curtail the injunctive risk.


CASE REFERENCE: TGI Paris, ordonnance de référé, January 11, 2019, GD Searle LLC et al. v. SAS Sandoz, RG No. 18/60334

Patentee schussing down

Are you getting tired of automotive equipment technology and anti-hypercholesterolemic drugs?

This would be understandable. Cheer up, as today I give you a seasonal alternative, with this ruling which involves a patent directed to a “method of securing, monitoring and management of the ski area of wintersportplaces“.

As if this technical field weren’t unconventional enough, the ruling is also unusual in that it was issued by the Lyon Cour d’appel.

The Paris courts have had exclusive jurisdiction over patent matters for a number of years now, so it is increasingly infrequent to come across a judgment issued in another forum. Who knows, this could actually be the very last one.

Mr. Costa, who lives in the Rhône département, owns European patent No. EP 1048789, filed in 2000 and which claims a French priority. The patent was licensed to a local company, Construction Moulage Fabrication Polyester (CMFP).

The patent was granted in 2003. Shortly thereafter, the patentee and the licensee initiated infringement proceedings against Perception and Guidance Embedded Systems (now Perguisys), Kässbohrer Engins au Service de l’Environnement as well as SA Aménagement Touristique de l’Alpe d’Huez et des Grandes Rousses. Already from the name of the third defendant, it can be inferred that the alleged infringement takes place in the Alps area.

As this was 15 years ago, the complaint was filed with the Lyon Tribunal de grande instance (TGI), which had jurisdiction at that time.

Two oppositions were filed at the EPO, one by Sabatier SA and a joint one by the defendants Perguisys and Kässbohrer. This led the Lyon TGI to stay proceedings pending the outcome of the opposition. Hence the extraordinary length of the proceedings.

The oppositions were rejected by the opposition division in 2006 and the rejection of the oppositions was confirmed by the Board of appeal in 2009. Only then were the infringement proceedings resumed. But it took 6 more years for the Lyon TGI to issue its judgment, in 2015. This is amazingly long but (1) we don’t know all the details, and it is possible that all parties did their best to delay the proceedings; and (2) now that patent litigation is centralized in Paris, my understanding is that there are no longer cases that drag on forever to this extent – except when the Cour de cassation successively sets aside appeal judgments four times, like in the Nergeco case discussed last week.

In the first instance judgment, the infringement claim was dismissed, and so was the defendants’ nullity counterclaim. The plaintiffs appealed, which now brings us to the appeal judgment.

Here is claim 1 of the patent at stake, again, not a conventional one, as you will see:

Method for protecting, following up maintenance and managing the field intended for skiing in a winter sports resort using mobile protection, control and maintenance means equipped with means for marking the position and guiding vehicles from a satellite network or from fixed markers, using fixed devices which need to be controlled and maintained, using a digitized cartography, as well as radio or remote transmission cables for transmitting digital data between at least one computer situated in a central station and computer terminals situated in intervention services or on mobile means fully or partially associated with automatic or manual coding means, characterized in that the computer system situated in the central station is able to divide the site of the winter sports resort into homogeneous zones with respect to at least one criterion from a series of coherent criteria zones stored in said computer system connected by remote transmission means to the mobile means and the intervention services so that when a mobile element is positioned in an homogeneous zone of the skiing field, the computer system of the central station is able to immediately be aware of the criteria applied to this homogeneous zone so as to deduce from this task orders, observations or action to be taken by the central unit and/or by the mobile element and/or by the intervention or maintenance services.

Peter Rabbit managing the ski area.

The validity discussion is extremely short in the decision.

Apparently, the defendants raised the same arguments of lack of novelty and lack of inventive step that they had already raised in first instance. The appeal judges thus simply stated that they agreed with the first instance judges and had nothing to add.

The infringement discussion is more interesting. The plaintiffs alleged that there was infringement by equivalence.

According to the court, the patented method comprises numerically mapping a ski resort site in the form of points according to coordinates, and then storing the information in a computer of a central station so as to provide a virtual grid in the form of planar polygones (cf. the claimed “digitized cartography“).

Fixed and mobile devices are deployed in the ski area and supply positional information to the central station using transmission means.

Still according to the court, the alleged infringement does not make use of virtual mapping and of a central station. Thus, the court held:

[…] Even though the [allegedly infringing] system uses GPS technical means, it does not achieve the sophistication of the patented system, in that it does not make it possible to provide a division of the area into homogeneous zones in real time on the screen, based on predefined and modifiable criteria.  Contrary to what the appelants state, this sophistication […] prevents infringement by equivalence from being acknowledged, as the Snow Sat system is of a lesser quality and lesser efficiency. 

Okay. This is kind of frustrating as it is very far from being a clear and complete infringement reasoning. But again, you probably cannot expect too much from a court that may not have seen any other patent case in a number of years.

But there is possibly one interesting take-away message though.

The established standard for assessing infringement by equivalence under French law is the following: two means are equivalent when, although they are of a different form, they perform a same function for a result of a same nature, if not of the same degree.

Lyon’s position is that, since the defendants’ method is not as efficient as the patented one, it does not infringe.

This is clearly confirmed by the court’s following statement:

[…] A means is not equivalent when its different implementation leads to a result of a same nature but of a different quality or efficiency. 

This is not a common aspect of equivalence discussions. But it is not unheard of. In fact, in a previous post, I reported on a similar analysis by the Paris Cour d’appel.

Thus, if anything, today’s judgment confirms that assessing infringement by equivalence is tricky. You cannot just look at the function of the means at stake – and at whether the function was known from the prior art. You also have to look at how effective the means is and what the quality of the end result is.


CASE REFERENCE: Cour d’appel de Lyon, 1ère chambre civile A, September 20, 2018, Antoine Costa et al. v. Perguisys et al. (RG No. 2015/06635).

The neverending story

Happy new year to all readers!

And, to make sure that we are off to a good start in 2019, consider this: it has been a while since we last heard of Nergeco and Maviflex, right? One of the longest and messiest examples of French patent litigation, perhaps only equaled by the pravastatin case. 

But a few weeks ago, Jean-Martin Chevalier, from the law firm Cousin & Associés, was the first one to kindly draw my attention to the latest episode of the saga. 

Drum roll… Ladies and gentlemen, we now have a 4th (yes, fourth) cassation ruling partly setting aside a previous judgment by an appeal court.

My previous post on the saga was entitled Groundhog case.

I might as well copy here the timeline of the case from this post and simply add the latest developments at the end of the list:

  • At the end of the nineties, Nergeco (patentee) and Nergeco France (licensee) sued two companies, Mavil (now Gewiss France) and Maviflex, for infringement of a European patent.
  • On December 21, 2000, the Lyon Tribunal de grande instance (TGI) held that the plaintiffs’ claims were admissible but ill-founded. The plaintiffs appealed.
  • On October 2, 2003, the Lyon Cour d’appel set aside the first instance judgment and concluded that the patent was infringed. The court ordered an expertise to assess damages.
  • On October 15, 2005, the Cour d’appel issued a second judgment further to the expertise. The amount of damages was set to 60,000 euros to the patentee (Nergeco) and 1,563,214 euros to the licensee (Nergeco France). The defendants then filed an appeal on points of law.
  • On July 10, 2007, the Cour de cassation partly set aside the 2005 judgment regarding the damages to be paid to the licensee. The reason for the reversal was that the Cour d’appel had not addressed the argument that the license agreement had been registered in the patent register only in 1998, so that it was not enforceable against third parties before that date. The case was thus remitted to a different Cour d’appel, in Paris this time.
  • On June 2, 2010, the Paris Cour d’appel held that all claims against Mavil (now Gewiss France) were in fact inadmissible as Mavil no longer existed when they were initially sued; and reduced the amount of damages to be paid by the second defendant Maviflex to the licensee Nergeco France by approximately half (taking into account the date at which the license agreement was registered and became enforceable against third parties). Both sides filed another appeal on points of law.
  • On September 20, 2011, the Cour de cassation set aside the 2010 judgment. First, because the Cour d’appel should have ruled on an argument of invalidity of the license agreement (there was no res judicata on this issue, as it was not addressed in the 2003 and 2005 judgments). Second, because the argument that the claims against Mavil were inadmissible should not have been given any consideration, as Mavil / Gewiss France acted in the proceedings as if their designation in the initial complaint was correct. In fact, this part of the decision became very famous since it is one of the few illustrations of an estoppel principle in this country.  The case was again remitted to the Paris Cour d’appel.
  • On June 21, 2013, in a new judgment by the Cour d’appel, the case was reexamined pursuant to the instructions of the Cour de cassation. But the actual outcome was pretty much the same as in the previous judgment. In particular, the damages award to Nergeco France was similar to the one ordered in 2010. The defendants filed a third appeal on points of law.
  • On December 16, 2014, the Cour de cassation set aside the 2013 judgment. Once again, the supreme court ruled that the appeal judges should have ruled on some arguments relating to the inadmissibility of Nergeco France’s claims.
  • On October 28, 2016, the Paris Cour d’appel held that the agreement containing the license provision was invalid. Nergeco France further filed a claim based on unfair competition, but this claim was held as new and thus inadmissible at this stage.

This leads us to the latest development: on September 26, 2018, the Cour de cassation set aside the 2016 judgment and remitted the case once more back to the Cour d’appel in a different composition.

As Forrest Gump would say, this case is like a chocolate box, you never know what you’re gonna get.

There were two parts in Nergeco’s appeal. According to the first part, the agreement containing the license provision should not have been held invalid. This part of the appeal was rejected by the Cour de cassation.

As explained in my previous post, there are two reasons why the license agreement was held invalid by the Cour d’appel.

First, the agreement was allegedly executed at a date when Nergeco France was not yet registered in the commerce register. But the agreement mentioned that Nergeco France was registered in the commerce register of Le Puy, under a certain number – which was untrue, as this registration only took place later. The agreement was thus executed by a company with no legal capacity. It can be surmised from these facts that either the execution date was erroneous, or the document was forged – although the appeal decision did not go down that road.

Second, the agreement only licensed the European patent at stake in the lawsuit but failed to license the corresponding French
priority patent. Under French law, this omission made the license invalid.

In front of the Cour de cassation, Nergeco argued that the parties to the agreement had proven their willingness to renew or continue the agreement after the cause for nullity of the agreement had disappeared.

In particular, the agreement was filed at the national patent register several years later, and amendments were signed, at a time when Nergeco France was properly registered (as indicated in the original agreement) and the French patent had ceased to be in force (due to the substitution of the European patent).

The supreme court was not convinced. If an agreement is invalid due to an “absolute” ground for nullity, it cannot be retroactively confirmed. Nergeco did not argue that another, valid license agreement had been executed at a later stage, but rather argued that the initially invalid agreement later became valid, and this is not possible according to the court.

But then there was the second part of Nergeco’s appeal, per which the Paris Cour d’appel wrongly held Nergeco’s unfair competition claim inadmissible. Here, the cassation judges sided with Nergeco.

Here is my translation of the Cour de cassation’s take on this. First point:

[…] The judgment [under appeal] stated that Nergeco France’s claim is inadmissible because [the court] cannot rule on a claim for damages on a different ground from the patent infringement ground, on which the claim was originally based, and on which the Lyon Cour d’appel ruled in a final ruling that it could in principle be indemnified.

By ruling in this manner, the Cour d’appel [erred] as the judgment of the Lyon Cour d’appel of October 2, 2003 did not decide, in the order, on the dispute relating to the ground for damages [now] filed by Nergeco France.

Second point:

[…] Partie’s submissions [on appeal] are not new when they have the same purpose as those filed in front of the first instance judge, even if the legal ground is different.

[…] The judgment [under appeal] stated that Nergeco France’s claim for remedy further to the acts of infringement of patent No. EP 0398791 is inadmissible because this company cannot file a claim for damages on a ground which is different from the patent infringement one, on which its claim was initially based.

By ruling in this manner, the Cour d’appel [erred] as the claims successively filed by Nergeco France based on article L. 615-2 Code de la propriété intellectuelle and then on article 1382, now article 1240 Code civil, both had the purpose of obtaining a remedy further to the harm caused by the patent infringement.

So if I understand correctly the court’s reasoning, Nergeco France’s claim is not “new on appeal” (and thus inadmissible) because Nergeco France simply changed the legal ground for its claim for damages, but the damages are still requested for the same purpose, in view of the same acts. And on the other hand, this more recent legal ground was not previously examined and there was thus no res judicata.

I have to say that I am a little bit surprised by this reasoning.

There is case law aplenty per which an unfair competition claim cannot be based on the exact same facts as a patent infringement claim.

If this is correct, then how can Nergeco France’s unfair competition claim not be “new” relative to the original patent infringement claim?

Besides, irrespective of the correctness of the legal reasoning, the practical outcome of this cassation ruling appears to be most unfortunate.

I find it preposterous that this is the tenth ruling in this litigation, and that it is still not yet the final one. You can probably count on at least two more: a further judgment of the Paris Cour d’appel, and then back again to the Cour de cassation, unless of course there are yet additional twists in the story.

Fortunately, this case is exceptional and is not representative of IP litigation in France in general. But seriously, what a terrible example…


CASE REFERENCE: Cour de cassation, ch. com., September 26, 2018, Nergeco France et al. v. Gewiss France et al., pourvoi No. Y 16-25937.

To be continued

I think it is high time to wish all readers of this blog happy holidays. 2018 was an eventful year in the small world of European patent law, and there is little doubt that 2019 will be as well.

Before you go, here is a short summary of a few things to watch out for in the coming year – so that you can ponder over those and make your own 2019 predictions while indulging in device- or apparatus-shaped chocolates, or while humming typical Christmas songs such as “we wish you a valid patent, we wish you a valid patent, we wish you a valid patent, and a happy new grant“.

Let me start with the topic of last week’s post, the new mandatory web-based filing system implemented by the INPI. Let’s hope that it will improve next year and become more manageable and user-friendly.

Two side notes on this topic. One, the INPI guidelines have now been updated to reflect the new filing procedure. You can download them here. Second, there was an interesting discussion in the comment section of the post. There seems to be a strong argument that the Patent Law Treaty makes it impossible for the patent office to prohibit paper filing. One reader reported that, in one of his cases, the INPI accepted a paper filing when the representative insisted. But there has been no communication from the office on this issue. The updated guidelines no longer mention paper filing, and neither does the decision of the Director of the INPI which sets up the new system.

Hopefully we will get some clarification in the near future.

And while we are talking about the INPI, there is actually a lot going out right now, as reported in one of my previous posts. Will the legislative reform be successfully completed? What will the French opposition proceedings look like? Will there indeed be a full examination of French national applications? If the current expectations are confirmed, this will be an upheaval of French patent practice – but so far the always important practical details have not been forthcoming.

Things are also moving on the SPC battlefront – aren’t they always – with a number of important pending references to the CJEU. Just a few days ago, the opinion of the Advocate General in Abraxis (C-443/17) was issued, and it calls into question Neurim (C-130/11), which is one of SPC applicants’ favorite CJEU rulings. See a full report by Alexa von Uexküll and Oswin Ridderbusch here. We’ll see which way this one goes. And perhaps one day we will finally get to understand what a “product” is – almost a philosophical question.

“A kit for creating an illusion that suggests a Santa Claus visit”. Wait a minute? Is Santa Claus just an illusion?

Turning now to the EPO, no upheaval in sight, but still some interesting developments.

First, the new version of the Rules of procedure of the Boards of appeal will likely be finalized soon. As noted by a number of colleagues, such as Adam Lacy and Thorsten Bausch (here), this will likely make the lives of many parties in appeal proceedings more difficult.

One side remark again: when I reported on T 1914/12 (which by the way does not seem to be very much followed by other Boards, see Peter de Lange’s blog here), I wondered whether the proposed revision of the rules of procedure could potentially be considered as breaching article 114 EPC, if one were to adhere to the reasoning of Board 3.2.05 in this decision. Any thoughts on this?

Next, a new online user consultation has been launched by the EPO regarding the possibility of a postponed examination option (see here). A very recurring subject indeed. We’ll see whether and how it progresses in 2019.

Last but not least, the broccoli / tomato / bell pepper battle is still raging at the EPO. Remember that it was decided in G2/12 and G2/13 that the exclusion of essentially biological processes for the production of plants from patentability does not preclude patents on the plants themselves. But the European Commission subsequently expressed its disagreement with this position, which led to the amendment of R. 28 EPC in July 2017. And then bang! Board 3.3.04 in T 1063/18 decided that amended R 28 EPC violates art. 53 EPC. See Laurent Teyssèdre’s report here. It is quite difficult to predict where things will go from there.

As a consolation, faithful readers of this blog will be satisfied that Lionel Vial correctly anticipated some of the current difficulties with the application of amended Rule 28 EPC one and a half year ago. Are you skeptical? The evidence is here.

This post would not be complete if I did not say a word on the white whale of European patent law: the UPC. Rumor had it that the
German Bundesverfassungsgericht would issue a decision on the constitutional complaint in December, but you know how it is with UPC-related rumors. So I would be surprised if we had a decision under the tree on Christmas morning, and the suspense will likely continue for some time. Come March 29 and the actual Brexit, it is clear that the plan will have to be reworked.

That’s all folks, season’s greetings to all!

Nightmares before Christmas

Beside the tribute to Tim Burton’s work in the title, this post is probably going to be of little interest to non-French patent attorney readers.

Sorry for that. 

On November 19, 2018, the INPI (French patent and trademark office) launched a new web-based patent filing system, called “Portail Brevets“, and shut down the good old EPO-style OLF system which we had been using for a number of years. 

It is likely that in the future the new system will be viewed as a major improvement, in particular because it should make an actual online management of patent applications possible.

But so far, I am sorry to say that it has been all but a nightmare for many users. The suddenness of the switch from the old system to the new system (no more OLF, no more fax, no more in-person filing) did not play well. The fact that some important developments still seem to be missing in the software did not make us happy campers either (address book anyone? configuration of pre-filled fields anyone?).

But the main issue is the following.

The new system only accepts a docx file for the text and drawings of the patent application. You may no longer upload pdf files. The docx file needs to comply with a number of requirements. If your file is not compliant, you get an error message. But most of the time the error message is so vague that it does not make it possible to immediately understand what is wrong with your file.

To me this is the most serious defect of the current Portail Brevets, as you can easily waste hours trying to figure out why the system does not like your docx file. 

The point of this blog post is not to criticize the INPI.

I am grateful for the efforts made by good people in the patent office working hard to modernize their tools and to provide patent applicants with the best level of service. I can also imagine that times must be stressful for the INPI too, as they are probably confronted with angry customers on a daily basis. 

No, my idea was rather to just provide a few tips based on my own experience as a newbie with the Portail Brevets, in case they may be of assistance to others. It would also be fantastic if readers could give some tips of their own in the comment section of this post. 

If you have had a problem filing via the Portail Brevets or if you have identified a potential trap, it is more than likely that other users will also encounter the same problem or fall into the identified trap. Thus why not contribute and help the entire community? 

In fact, if this appears to be useful in view of the comments, I will consider completing this post in the future to incorporate all relevant contributions into the body of the post, so as to provide a useful resource to all stakeholders. 

Note that most if not all of the issues should be avoided if you carefully read and digest the user’s documentation (here, here, here and there). But putting theory into practice is never an easy task, and I tend to think that a sort of practical troubleshooting description can always be useful.  

Season’s greetings.

So here we go with the difficulties / traps that I have identified so far: 

  • In the drawings section, you should type [Fig. 1] or the like, then a single paragraph break (“enter“), then immediately insert your drawing image. If there are several paragraph breaks, you will get an error message. 
  • In the description, you want to make the first reference to your drawing figures in an individualized manner, and the figure tag should be exactly at the beginning of a line. Thus, you should type: “[Fig. 1] shows …“; and then on the next line: “[Fig. 2] shows…“. You should not write “[Fig. 1] and [Fig. 2] show…“. Nor should you write “An embodiment of the invention is shown on [Fig. 1]“. And since we are actually talking about French language texts, you should not write “La [Fig. 1]…” either, because then the figure tag is not at the very beginning of the line. 
  • Beware of lists in MS Word. For instance, if you have a list with a), b), c) and if item c) comprises a list with bullet points, the bullet points will be automatically renumbered as d), e) etc. in the pdf file generated by the software. One way to avoid this is to keep only the first list and manually insert hyphens or like symbols for the second list. At any rate, you should carefully check all lists in the pdf file generated by the software. 
  • The same applies all the more so to lists in the claim section. Paragraph breaks (“enter“) should be avoided within a claim, and only line breaks (“shift + enter“) should be used. Otherwise, your claim numbering and count could be erroneous. 
  • If you insert an image into your document, and if the docx file is not approved by the system, you may try to convert the image to a different type before reinserting it.
  • A number of expressions are recognized as tags by the software, even though they are without square brackets. This means that they will be renamed and treated as section headings in the pdf file that is generated. The list of relevant expressions can be found in one of the documentation files linked to above. As a result, (1) if you use a slightly different wording, the expression will not be recognized and treated as a section heading; and (2) you cannot change the headings in the generated pdf file. For instance, if you type “Description détaillée“, your final heading will read “Description des modes de réalisation“.  Too bad if, like me, you tend to prefer “Description de modes de réalisation” (embodiments vs. the embodiments). 
  • If you use the MS Word upper case style, for instance for the title of the invention, the formatting is lost in the generated pdf. In other terms if you have typed “DeVicE” in your docx file but it reads “DEVICE” because of the upper case style, the pdf will nevertheless show “DeVicE“. It may therefore be best not to use the upper case style at all. 
  • As a warning, when you press the pay button, the application is filed. There is no “file application” button or the like. 

That’s all for the time being. If you cannot figure out where the error is in your docx file, it is possible to call the INPI for help and possibly send them the file by email so that they can look at it and advise you. But of course this process takes a little bit of time. 

Good luck everyone!